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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, United States naval forces have had to 
adapt to a rapidly changing security environment.  To better contribute to the 
U.S. War on Terror, former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark and 
his successor, Admiral Mike Mullen, decided in mid 2005 to rebuild the Navy’s 
riverine forces.  Such a capability, with limited exceptions, had not been 
emphasized since the end of the Vietnam War.   
In 2005, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a review of the 
Navy’s “past, current, and future” riverine capabilities and identified key gaps, 
specifically in counterinsurgency and Line of Communication operations. Using 
the CNA study as the baseline, this thesis will examine Colombia’s 50 year 
riverine experience combating insurgent guerrillas and providing security along 
its 15,000 kilometers of rivers.  This research will address the capability gaps 
identified in the CNA study.  It is based on interviews conducted in Colombia of 
U.S. and Colombian military personnel, and research of Colombian naval 
archives obtained during a September, 2007, visit to the country. 
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The nature of the United States naval force has changed in response to 
world and national events.  The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s removed the defensive focus of a single source threat.  
The Navy, in response, sought to diversify its forces away from massed 
formations and increased the development of its littoral assets.1  Nearly a decade 
later, another momentous event would bring forth a similar transformation.  The 
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, altered the Navy’s focus 
once again as the United States entered into a new war.  All efforts would now 
have to converge on defeating terrorism in an environment of asymmetric 
warfare.  This required the U.S. Navy to restructure its force in order to confront a 
new enemy and better address the needs of the nation.  On July 6, 2005, Admiral 
Vern Clark, the then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), issued a memorandum by 
which he took the first steps of reorganization.  In it he declared the need to 
“expand the Navy’s capabilities to prosecute the GWOT [Global War on 
Terrorism].”2  The actions he called for, including the establishment of a riverine 
force, were to be completed in various stages between 2005 and 2007.  As his 
successor, Admiral Mullen, took office, he concurred with Admiral Clark’s views.  
He understood the need for a “green water capability…and [believed] our Navy 
[was] missing a great opportunity to influence events by not having a riverine 
force.”3 
On October 1, 2005, the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
was informally stood up.  Among the NECC’s first priorities was the development 
of a new riverine force.  In March of 2006, the NECC was also given the goal to 
                                            
1 Robert Benbow, Fred Ensminger, Peter Swartz, Scott Savitz and Major Dan Stimpson, 
“Renewal of Navy’s Riverine Capability: A Preliminary Examination of Past, Current and Future 
Capabilities,” Center for Naval Analysis Corporation (March 2006): 6.   
2 Ronald O’Rourke. “Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) – Background and 
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (February 2006): 3. 
3 Benbow, et al. 5. 
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having an operational unit by March of 2007.4  They accomplished both 
milestones on time.  In the early morning of March 8, 2007, the 150 personnel 
that form Riverine Squadron 1, a subset of Riverine Group One, was deployed to 
western Iraq.  Their mission was to secure the Euphrates River, a task performed 
by the Marine Corps since the beginning of the war.5  To date, the U.S. Navy, 
through the NECC, has formed a Riverine Group with three riverine squadrons.  
Each squadron is expected to have 224 personnel and 16 multi-mission Riverine 
craft.6   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
By law every four years, senior members of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) must come together and assess the status of the department and its 
performance in meeting the security challenges shaping the world.  In 2005, 
civilian as well as military personnel from DOD reviewed the conclusions of the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, applied lessons learned from the previous 
four years, and drew assumptions regarding the changing nature of the world we 
now live in.  It is important to note that the QDR is not a “programmatic or budget 
document.”  Rather, it embodies the current thinking of DOD leadership as it 
attempts to transform itself by evoking a “shift of emphasis to meet the new 
strategic environment.”7  In May of 2005, the CNO assembled a Global War On 
Terrorism (GWOT) Working Group to aid in this shift.8  At day’s end, the GWOT 
working group defined six overarching GWOT missions.  The group also 
 
                                            
4 Benbow, et al. 7. 
5 Andrew Scutro. “First riverine unit deploys to Iraq,” Navy Times, (March 2007). 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/03/ntrivron070308/ (accessed September 18, 2007).  
6 “What will the riverine mission encompass?” Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/ (accessed October 3, 2007).  
7 Department of Defense. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” (Washington, February 
2006): v-vi. 
8 Benbow, et al. 6. 
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identified 19 tasks and 107 capabilities specific to the Navy.9  Most importantly, 
the working group found that the Navy lacked the capability to conduct riverine 
operations.  
The findings of the GWOT working group prompted the Chief of Naval 
Operations to reestablish the U.S. Navy’s riverine capability.  Soon after, the 
Director of Deep Blue (OPNAV N3/5) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
to conduct a study of the potential riverine resources available and the potential 
capability gaps that might arise once this force would be established. 
The CNA developed an “analytical methodology [in order] to determine the 
riverine requirements.”10  They defined riverine tasks, conditions, standards, and 
resources as the basis from which to evaluate future riverine capabilities.  This 
analytical structure was then used to assess the Navy’s riverine resources to 
determine its capabilities across the range of military operations (ROMO) as 
defined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC).  The CNA 
study concluded that in FY07 a newly established riverine force would give the 
Navy a substantial capability to accomplish security assistance (SA), 
humanitarian assistance (HA), and counter-drug (CD) operations.  In the same 
timeframe, the Navy would only have a limited capability to support 
unconventional warfare, GWOT, and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.  
Credible capability gaps were identified in the Navy’s riverine ability to execute 
major combat operations (MCO) and line of communication (LOC) protection 
(river control and security).  The Navy’s noncombatant evacuation operations 
(NEO) capability was almost negligible. 
The majority of the recommendations offered by the March, 2006, CNA 
report, as a form of redress, involved the use of previously established tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP).  In addition, the CNA considered accessing 
other resources organic to the U.S. Navy, such as those found within the Navy 
                                            
9 Benbow, et al. 6. 
10 Benbow, et al. 2. 
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Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC).  Not much attention, however, was 
given to external organizations that could expand the Navy’s knowledge base of 
riverine operations.  Within the western hemisphere, Colombia has had a long 
standing struggle, lasting over 50 years, against insurgent guerrillas who have 
made great tactical use of the country’s over 12,000 kilometers (km) of navigable 
waterways to operate in ungoverned areas of the country and fund their 
operations through the drug trade.  In response, the Colombian Navy (COLNAV) 
developed a rudimentary riverine force in the 1950’s, which was then 
consolidated and further formalized by the 1970s.  Colombia’s development of an 
experienced and combat tested riverine force, in an effort to curtail the country’s 
insurgency problem, is a credible and accessible source of potential lessons for 
the U.S. riverine force and, as such, merits further study.  
B. COLOMBIAN RIVERINE FORCES 
Colombia has been actively engaged in riverine operations for over fifty 
years.  Their history dates back to 1956 and the creation of the “Flotilla Avispa” 
(“Wasp Flotilla”).  This nascent amphibious force began operations with 13 foot 
aluminum boats armed with M-1 rifles and one Browning machinegun.  They 
were created to regain “control of the public order and guarantee the national 
sovereignty”11 in the remote rivers of southern Colombia.  As part of the 
Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR) they formed part of the governmental 
response against the insurgent violence of the 1950s.  Their humble beginning 
was marked by bravery, heroism and innovation; attributes made necessary by 





                                            
11 “Quinto Aniversario de la Brigada Fluvial de I.M,” Armada Nacional de Colombia, (August 
2004). http://www.armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=54687, (accessed January 29, 2007).  
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Flotilla of the 1950s became the government’s front line in a push outward to 
establish a presence along remote forward areas like Tumaco, Buenaventura, 
Cartagena, and Bogotá.12    
Their mission grew further as Colombia experienced a resurgence of 
violence during the 1980s.  The appearance of narco traffickers coupled with the 
actions of guerrilla groups during this period demanded that the government, vis-
à-vis the military, again seek to exert greater control and jurisdiction of the 
outlying territories.  Extension of the riverine forces into these areas meant that 
they would have to contend not only with experienced insurgent enemy forces 
but also manage and adapt to Colombia’s extensive riverine structure.  Colombia 
is composed of 30 principal navigable rivers and 68 principal river mouths, this 
net of rivers totals 15,774 km of which 12,660 km are considered navigable.13  It 
was in this expansive environment and against a battle hardened enemy that the 
Colombian riverine forces began to develop innovative techniques in riverine 
warfare.14  
In 1989, under the Andean Ridge Initiative and a renewed surge against 
the war on drugs, the United States increased its interaction and support of the 
Colombian efforts.  The U.S. Marine Corps provided the Colombian riverine 
forces with a higher degree of training and advanced equipment.  To date, the 
Colombian Marine Corps has grown to be the second largest in the world; 
standing at 23,200 strong.  More importantly, the COLMAR now possesses the 
largest riverine force in the world.15 
                                            
12 Armada Nacional de Colombia. La Infanteria de Marina Colombiana: Trascendencia e 
Imagen del Cuerpo de Tropa de la Armada Nacional, (Colombia, June 2006), 
http://www.armada.mil.co/ (accessed May 23, 2007). 
13Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Importancia de la I.M. en el Desarrollo del Poder Naval,” 
(Colombia, May 2004): 22.   
14 CC Orlando Cubillos, Armada Nacional de Colombia. Interview by author, Monterey, 
California (May 9, 2007).  
15 “Operaciones Fluviales: Infanteria de Marina,” Armada Nacional de Colombia, (June 
2007): 12. 
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With a history dating back nearly 50 years, the Colombian Marines have 
been able to develop a force highly capable at riverine warfare.  Between 2002 
and 2007, the riverine forces systematically regained control of major principal 
rivers in the country after a period in which the national government had 
neglected this area.  For example, the forces have secured the Magdalena River, 
which runs vertically in the Caribbean part of the country for nearly 890 km and 
serves as a main throughway for transportation and subsequent export of 
national resources like oil.  The actions of the Riverine Battalion 30 (BAFLIM 30) 
have allowed the increase of legitimate free commerce to return to the river as 
well as local communal fishing and trade.  No other currently active riverine force 
has experienced such an extended and dynamic struggle against insurgent 
subversive guerrillas.  The harsh and diverse environment forced the innovative 
development of ships and mobile riverine stations.  The Nodriza, for example, is 
a ship that was developed and manufactured in Colombia and serves as a 
formidable replenishment, support, and attack unit that is key to the success of 
the Colombian riverine strategy.   
Their innovation, operational success, and decades of experience make 
the Colombian riverine forces a pertinent case to study.  Information garnered 
form Colombia will offer a mixture of lessons that should prove invaluable as the 
U.S. Navy begins to rebuild its riverine capabilities and faces new challenges. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to provide a relevant case study from 
which to address some of the capability gaps found by the CNA report.  In 
particular, the thesis will examine the current capabilities of the Colombian 
riverine forces as they pertain to counterinsurgency and line of communication 
operations (river control and river security).  
Addressing these capability gaps will be a major undertaking for the newly 
formed riverine forces.  The Colombian riverine force, and its experience 
spanning over five decades, stands as a suitable source of credible, established, 
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and current information.  A look into its tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) and manner in which they conduct operations across the range of military 
operations (ROMO) would be beneficial.  Specifically, a study of their progress 
with counterinsurgency and line of communication operations, for both river 
control and security, would further aid the proper development of the U.S. 
riverine force.  An in-depth look into their rich history against a world renown and 
competent foe would garner constructive and invaluable lessons. 
Learning the doctrine and techniques used by Colombia’s riverine force is 
not only applicable to the current development of the U.S. force.  Colombia’s 
diverse climate, topography and extensive riverine systems make these lessons 
applicable to various regions of the world where the U.S. might become engaged 
in the future.  Harnessing that knowledge now and imbedding it into the training 
of the U.S. force at its infancy will only better prepare it for future unknown 
contingencies. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will first examine the capability gaps identified by the CNA 
study presented on March 2006.  Chapter II begins with a detailed description of 
the methodology used by the Center for Naval Analyses and describes the U.S. 
riverine capability gaps identified by the CNA report.  This thesis will specifically 
focus on the gaps found within counterinsurgency and line of communication 
operations. 
Chapter III discusses Colombia and its merits as a suitable case study.  It 
provides a developmental history of the country’s riverine forces, from their initial 
formation in the mid 1950s to their present standing as a formidable and 
proficient force.  This chapter showcases the various adversaries the Colombian 
riverine forces have had to contend with, reaffirms Colombia’s need for a 
continuous and well developed riverine force and the wealth of knowledge that 
resides therein as a consequence of it.  Chapter IV provides a more detailed 
assessment of the recent successes of the riverine forces and the approaches 
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that made this possible.  It describes Colombian riverine tactics and operations 
and highlights the many innovations developed by the Colombian forces.  The 
Riverine Support Patrol Boat, for example, is an innovation that provides the 
riverine force with defensive and logistical support along with overwhelming 
firepower.  Colombia’s use of these capabilities coupled with the targeting of 
natural and trafficking choke points has allowed them to control and secure their 
country’s riverways against guerrilla forces.   
The primary source to identify the capability gaps in the U.S. riverine force 
will be the CNA report that was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations on 
March 2006.  Unfortunately, very few books specifically discuss the development 
of the Colombian riverine force.  Two books, however, authored by the 
Colombian Navy, offer an in-depth look at the influence of the Colombian 
Marines in the history of the country.  They represent the most reliable data from 
which to construct a historical timeline specific to their riverine force.  Input and 
assistance from the U.S. Marine branch of the Military Group stationed in 
Colombia has been critical to this research.  They provided current data on 
Colombian operations from the U.S. perspective and facilitated interviews with 
various key personnel in the Colombian riverine force during my visit to the 
country in September of 2007.  
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II. U.S. RIVERINE FORCES AND THE CAPABILITY GAP 
The nation’s call for the development of a riverine force during times of 
war is nothing new.  As would be expected, difficulties associated with the 
creation of a brand new force have been experienced during each occasion.  As 
it stands, it seems that the 2005 decision to expand the U.S. Navy’s capability 
into the riverine environment will suffer from similar growing pains.  This chapter 
is divided into three sections.  The first presents a brief history of U.S. 
involvement in wartime riverine operations, highlighting the lessons to be learned 
from past campaigns.  It also provides a timeline of the formation of Riverine 
Group One and a description of the current force as it stands. 
The second section of the chapter reviews the methodology used by the 
CNA in their assessment of the Navy’s future riverine capabilities.  The CNA 
study was conducted from early 2005 to March 2006 to examine how the Navy’s 
projected stand-up of its riverine capability might fare against the range of military 
operations in FY07 and FY10.  The final section of the chapter describes the 
capability gaps identified in the CNA study and presented to the CNO in March 
2006.  Specifically, it will focus on two military operations of interest, COIN and 
LOC operations.  Naval riverine support of either of these military functions in 
FY07 was judged by the CNA to be “limited” to “negligible.”  In contrast, COIN 
and LOC protection, both in river control and security, are functions in which the 
Colombian Riverine force is experienced and successful.  As such, they 
represent the two areas where considerable gains can be made.  
A. U.S. NAVAL RIVERINE FORCE 
Riverine operations are not a recent phenomenon.  U.S. history is replete 
with examples of military operations and involvement in its rivers.  The nation’s 
military recognized early the tactical advantage and strategic value to be gained 
from operations within the riparian environment.  In almost every major conflict or 
crisis, the U.S. has required the development of a riverine force.  Examples 
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include the Second Seminole Indian War (1835-1842), the Civil War (1861-
1865), and most recently the Vietnam War (1965-1972). 
The Second Seminole Indian War was fought for seven years in the heart 
of the Everglades of south Florida.  The Seminole refusal to relocate away from 
their ancestral lands and into remote reservations west of the Mississippi became 
the spark that ignited the war.  Outnumbered and outmatched, the Seminole 
Indians exploited the terrain of the Everglades and through small unit tactics 
engaged in efficient guerrilla (unconventional) warfare.  The U.S. military, both 
Army and Navy, failed numerous times to engage the enemy in a decisive battle.  
The Navy’s efforts were concentrated in the littoral environment.  Specifically, 
they attempted to exert a type of blockade, to include coastal and inland 
waterways, in order to stop the flow of illegal weapons to the Seminole Indians.  
Supply depots were also set up along navigable rivers from which the Army could 
initiate land campaigns.  The Navy was charged with the re-supply of these 
bases.  Poor coordination among both services, however, derailed this strategy; 
leaving the Army incapable of penetrating deep into Seminole territory.  For two 
years the Seminoles were successful in this type of guerrilla warfare.  It was not 
until September of 1837 when Navy Lieutenant Levine M. Powell proposed a 
concept that would later become the basis from which to develop a riverine 
force.16      
The initial riverine force was comprised of 200 soldiers, including sailors 
and marines.  Under the command of Lieutenant Powell, this force was to 
engage the Seminoles warriors and direct their movements towards awaiting 
conventional forces.  Powell was an aggressive leader who believed in 
confronting the Seminoles on their turf.  Among the many skirmishes, Lieutenant 
Powell and his riverine force saw battle in 1838 in the St. Lucie and New Rivers.  
Both of these engagements proved essential in the development of riverine 
tactics.  The New River encounter in March of 1838, specifically, showed the 
                                            
16 Mark Freitas and Braddock W. Treadway. Stygian Myth: U.S. Riverine Operations Against 
the Guerrilla (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994): 23-26. 
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effectiveness of mounting small naval artillery on shallow draft boats.  It wasn’t 
until 1839, however, with the formation of the “Mosquito Fleet,” that the United 
States was finally able to project superior firepower in direct engagement with the 
Seminole Indians.  Lieutenant McLaughlin, in charge of the new Mosquito Fleet, 
led this force in various expeditions throughout the Everglades.  From 1839 to 
1842, McLaughlin’s force did not engage in major battle nor encounter large 
enemy forces.  Instead, he found several “encampments and destroyed vital 
resources.”17  During his campaign, he ruined hidden cultivation sites critical to 
the survival of the Seminole warriors and their families.  On May 10, 1842, direct 
action against the Seminoles ceased.  By that date, the riverine force had grown 
to “twelve small sailing vessels, a few barges, 50 officers, 582 enlisted men, and 
140 dugout canoes.”18  By June of that same year, the riverine force was 
disbanded.  In his ventures, Lieutenant McLaughlin not only proved the capability 
of riverine forces to conduct sustained operations but, more importantly, 
demonstrated the devastating effects of an attrition strategy. 
Much like the Second Seminole War, the requirement for a riverine 
capability during the American Civil War did not come until after the 
commencement of hostilities.  Once the war started, both the Union and 
Confederate sides recognized the potential in riverine operations.  As a result, 
each side moved quickly to develop and build their new force.19  There were 
clear differences, however, between the North and the South in terms of  
resources and industrial capacity.  The Union’s initial strategic plan, the 
“Anaconda Plan”, sought to further deprive the Confederacy of resources by 
enacting a naval blockade and to use the Mississippi and Ohio rivers as venues 
from which to launch offensive operations.  This plan gave the emerging riverine 
force the necessary direction and needed end state around which to develop its 
                                            
17 Freitas and. Treadway, 30. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Michael C. McCurry. Riverine Force: A Vital Navy Capability for the Joint Force. (Newport: 
Naval War College, February 2006): 6. 
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capabilities.  On the other hand, the South’s lack of industry and scarce 
resources undermined the Confederate fleet before it even started.  They were 
not capable of sustaining a fleet size necessary to contend with the North.  
Ultimately, the Union became successful at riverine operations and used them 
efficiently to divide the South along the Mississippi River.20   
One of the important riverine developments of the American Civil War was 
the use of ironclads for many functions.  These flat-bottom vessels were well 
designed for riverine operations, permitting access to diverse locations along the 
riverways and serving as a transport unit for Army land operations.  They also 
became well adept at providing fire support for ground units, thus increasing the 
attack capabilities that were crucial to the Union’s campaign.  As sections of the 
river came under Union control, the riverine forces began to develop 
counterinsurgency patrolling tactics.  The requirements made by Rear Admiral 
Porter, calling for a constant patrol of the rivers, enabled the new force to 
become adept at reconnaissance and interdiction operations.  During this 
conflict, the Union military also experimented with different command and control 
structures.  The norm of those times was for the riverine element to be under the 
command of the Army field commander.  An innovation in thinking pushed this 
capability under the command of the Navy and made its service to the Army on a 
“not-to-interfere” basis only.  This realignment was quite revolutionary for the time 
and paved the way for future command and control structures.21   
At the onset of the Vietnam War, the “[U.S.] military did not have an 
organic riverine capability when one was needed.”22  As a result, the U.S. Navy 
found itself once again “forced to jumpstart the program.”  In order to allow 
sufficient time to develop its riverine capability, the U.S. Navy first assumed the 
role of advisor to the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) in 1964.   This role both provided 
the VNN with the professional development of its officers and enlisted personnel 
                                            
20 McCurry, 6. 
21 McCurry,  8. 
22 McCurry, 10.,  
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and offered the U.S. Navy some much needed riverine experience.23  The U.S. 
riverine experience in Vietnam differed in scope and scale from any previous 
wars.  The tenacity and persistence of the Viet Cong (VC) forces made this war 
the setting “for America’s most intensive riverine warfare experience against an 
unconventional opponent.”24   
The use of American riverine forces in the Mekong Delta lasted from 1965 
to 1969.  During this time, the Navy developed its riverine capability through the 
engagement of three distinct operations: MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, and 
SEALORDS.25  Each of these three operations provided the Navy with an 
opportunity to learn tactics and develop innovations in riverine warfare.  
Operation MARKET TIME initiated a seaborne blockade off the coast of South 
Vietnam.  Its main purpose was to deter or intercept provisional shipments from 
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).  The blockade was maintained through the 
duration of the war.  It, however, did not completely diminish the infiltration of war 
materials from the NVA to the Viet Cong.  As a result of the blockade, enemy 
forces shifted their focus further inland along the shallow and coastal waters of 
the Mekong Delta.  In response to this strategic maneuver, the U.S. Navy 
launched operation GAME WARDEN.  This operation made use of shallow draft 
boats called “Swift” boats to engage the enemy along inland waterways.  What is 
important about operation GAME WARDEN is the introduction of helicopters (35 
by 1966) in direct support of riverine operations.   
By late 1966, the enemy had increased operations along the Rung Sat 
Special Zone.  At that time, neither the U.S. Navy nor Army was heavily engaged 
in that zone.  The absence of ground troops in the area made the riverine units 
vulnerable to riverbank incursions and attacks.  This weakness further prevented 
American units from engaging the enemy further inland.  As a result, General 
Westmoreland, Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
                                            
23 McCurry, 10. 
24 Freitas and Treadway, 51. 
25 McCurry,10. 
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(COMUSMACV) approved a new concept and developed the Mobile Riverine 
Force (MRF).  This new force would be comprised of an Army-reinforced brigade 
and two supporting Navy River Assault Groups.  These innovations gave General 
Westmoreland the flexibility of a self contained unit able to engage the enemy at 
a location and time of his choosing.  The capabilities of the MRF increased over 
time and elements such as artillery, armored troop carriers and helicopters 
expanded the unit’s ability to execute rapid troop movements and medical 
evacuations and to provide massive fire support.    
A look into each of these historic cases offers a glimpse into the 
development of U.S. riverine warfare.  Notable trends emerge and repeat 
themselves during each crisis.  The importance and need to use the rivers, for 
example, has been recognized only after the nation was engaged in war.  This 
observation implicitly exposes the fact that the U.S. military has not sustained a 
credible riverine capability during times of peace.  During each crisis, be it the 
Seminole, Civil, or Vietnam War, it took years and massive mobilization of 
resources to develop and begin to exploit the benefits of a riverine force.   
Several lessons can also be learned from these crises.  The Second 
Seminole War proved the riverine force does not need to directly engage or 
destroy the enemy.  Attrition strategies aimed at restricting the resources vital to 
the enemy can be just as crippling and effective.  This event also proved that 
riverine fleets can be summarily capable when fitted with weapons capable of 
providing supporting fire.  During the Civil War, the importance of developing a 
sizeable force that was sufficient to engage the enemy could not be overstated 
enough.  The lack of resources and industrial capability hampered the 
Confederate ability to develop a credible riverine force.  As a result, they were 
vulnerable to a mobile and lethal force capable of dictating terms by having 
unrestricted freedom to choose the time and location of battle.  The innovations 
in terms of technology, structure and function of the Union riverine forces were 
also impressive and endured to become the basis of future riverine development.  
Finally, the Vietnam War exposed the immense advantage that is gained when 
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riverine forces are provided with direct aerial support.  Most importantly, the 
Mobile Riverine Force showed that mobility, self-containment, and fire power can 
be applied with great success to the riverine environment.   
Following Vietnam, the riverine forces were quickly dismantled as war 
budgets decreased and the immediate need for such a force diminished.  The 
capability resurfaced in the early 1980s and 1990s, to a much lesser scale, within 
the Special Forces and Marine Corps.  The U.S. war efforts since 2001 to 
counter terrorism have, once again, made riverine operations increasingly 
relevant.  U.S. operations in Iraq have seen the need for a riverine capability able 
to engage the enemy along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.  The 2005 
Quadrennial Defense Review sought to “provide a riverine capability for river 
patrol, interdiction and tactical troop movement on inland waterways.”26  The 
U.S. Navy saw this as an opportunity to become further engaged in the Global 
War on Terrorism 
By January 13, 2006, the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
formally attained its charter as “a stand alone command.”27  This signified a 
momentous shift that legitimized the existence and commitment toward a newly 
formed U.S. naval riverine force.  By May 25 of the same year, Riverine Group 
(RIVGRU) 1 and Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 1 were formally established.  
Development of RIVRON 1 became the stepping-stone that served as the 
foundation and template for future growth.  This end-state goal, as outlined by 
the CNO, called for one Riverine Group composed of 800 personnel dispersed 
among three riverine squadrons.28 
                                            
26 Department of Defense. “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” (Washington, February 
2006): 48. 
27 “How did the NECC come into existence?” Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/ (accessed on June 12, 2007).  
28 “U.S. Navy Riverine Group: Concept of Operations.” Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command, (September 2006): 27. 
 16
Each riverine squadron would consist of 12 riverine craft, organized into 3 
detachments of 4 boat teams each.29  The force structure, at both the crew and 
squadron level, is designed to support continuous operations.  Manning at the 
crew level consists of two crews of Active Duty personnel per riverine craft.  This 
translates to an arduous two-shift duty section with long-term implications that 
might be difficult to maintain.  At the squadron level, the structure in place allows 
for at least one squadron to be continuously deployed to “one contingency at a 
time.”30  Among the two remain squadrons; one would be dedicated to unit level 
training and maintenance in accordance with the Fleet Response Plan while the 
other would maintain “surge” status.31  Riverine Group One has achieved 
tremendous milestones in a compressed period of time.  In just over a year, 
RIVGRU 1 has grown from “a small group of Sailors in Little Creek…to three 
active squadrons.”32 One of those squadrons, RIVRON 1, was deployed on 
March 8, 2007, and is currently active in Iraq.  The two remaining squadrons 
were to be active by Fiscal Year (FY) 09 and Fiscal Year (FY) 10.  This timeline 
was met ahead of schedule as Riverine Squadrons 2 and 3 were established on 
February 2, 2007 and July 6, 2007, respectively.33  
B. CNA STUDY METHODOLOGY 
In May 2005, a GWOT Working Group was assembled to support the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of that same year.  The Working Group 
addressed the Navy’s mission and capabilities as a whole and identified 
                                            
29 Benbow, et al. 8. 
30 “U.S. Navy Riverine Group: Concept of Operations.” Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command, (September 2006): 11. 
31 The Navy delineated three types of “surge status.”  Units under surge status remain 
obligated for a period of time before and after their assigned deployment schedules that allows for 
a more flexible and contingency ready force. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/frp.htm 
(accessed June 12, 2007). 
32 Benbow, et al. 8. 
33 Senior Chief Mass Communication Specialist (SW/AW) Dave Nagle. “Riverine Force 
Marks One-Year Anniversary,” Navy.mil, (Norfolk, Virginia, June 7, 2007), 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=29926, (accessed July 25, 2007). 
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capability gaps in riverine operations.  As a result, the Director of Deep Blue 
(OPNAV N3/5) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to conduct a further 
review of the Navy’s “past, current, and future” riverine capabilities.  Specifically, 
they analyzed the force capabilities for 2007 taking into consideration existing 
resources. 
The findings of the GWOT Working Group laid a generalized and basic 
framework from which the CNA conducted its more detailed study.  The CNA 
study was requested by the Navy to better develop a riverine capability integral to 
the transforming vision of the CNO.  The CNA study offered an unbiased outside 
look specifically focused on the Navy’s riverine force.  Having this perspective 
applied to the problem provided a degree of legitimacy and, more importantly, 
credibility to the results of the report.  This section discusses the terminology and 
methodology used in the report. 
1. Tasks 
Riverine tasks refer to both operational and functional tasks.  The 
operational tasks listed in Table 1 are an amalgam of the most likely tasks to be 
performed by a riverine force.  These were obtained from doctrinal and tactical 
sources such as the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and its service derivative 
the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL).  It is important to note that this table is not 
all-inclusive as operations can be affected by innumerable variations of implied 
and specified tasks.  The functional tasks presented in Table 2, on the other 
hand, are used to connect the operational tasks with the conditions and 
standards set by the commander.  Functional tasks allow the commander, or in 
this case the CNA study group, to reduce the number of tasks into a more 
convenient form.  With a more defined and manageable set of tasks, it is easier 
to derive the needed resources and requirements.34  
                                            
34 Benbow, et al. 51-56. 
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Table 1.   Operational Tasks Relevant to Riverine Units 
Source: Benbow, et al, 52-53 





Exploitation and pursuit Interdiction, attack
Area security, including:                 
River control (along and across 
thewaterway)                        
River denial (a form of control)       
Patrol (mobile); attack; 
interdiction; visit, board, search 
and seizure (VBSS); waterborne 
guard post; control point; and 
counter-mobility (obstacles, 
mining)
Security escort (convoys, high-
value assets)
Mine countermeasures (MCM) and 
breaching




Riverine Training Teams; Riverine 
Operations Seminar Teams
Support to foreign planning, intel, 
logistics, and/or effects
Support to counter drug 
operations





transport/distribute personnel and 
supplies, etc.)
Deploy and redeploy riverine 
forces
Search and rescue (SAR), Combat 
SAR (CSAR)
Civil support (civil defense, 
disaster relief)
Show of force
Operations other than war
Defensive Operations





Table 2.   Functional Tasks for Riverine Units  
Functional Task Categories Example Functional Tasks
Operate and maneuver watercraft
Maintain watercraft
Navigate waterways (day, night, weather)
Provide waterborne lift for insert/extract of personnel and gear 
associated with: GCE, reconnaissance and survailance, NSW, 
SAR, EOD, combat and civil engineers, NEO.
Employ visual and electronic sensors
Employ human exploitation team (HET) to collect HUMINT
Coordinate with rotary-wing (RW) recon support for river patrol
Direct fire support (up to heavy machine guns)
Forward air control for fixed-wing (FX) or RW close air support 
(CAS)
Act as forward observer for indirect fires
Conduct information ops in vicinity of (IVO) waterways
Employ non-lethal weapons IVO waterways
Conduct joint missions planning, including employment of joint 
intel products
Provide C2 organic fires and maneuver
Integrate direct fires and maneuver w/adjacent GCE
De-conflict organic direct fires w/friendly forces and facilities 
IVO waterway
Provide initial terminal guidance for helo landing zone (LZ) IVO 
waterways
Plan, coordinate, and conduct sustainment and resupply
Salvage equipment and watercraft
Manage transportation and distribution of humanitarian 
aid/disaster relief supplies
Manage casualties (medical capability)
Evacuate casualties via waterways
Trasnfer casualties to over-land or RW transport
Protect against direct fire and rocket porpelled grenades (RPG)
Protect against indirect fire (targeting operating base, landing 
site, or river chockepoints)
Operate in a mining/IED environment
Operate IVO small boats of unknown disposition
Protect against attack-swimmer threat
Recover personnel and critical equipment and watercraft under 
fire
Patrol (coordinate with GCE to patrol) river banks IVO river ops
Logistics
Force protection or security
Waterborne mobility
Intelligence, survailance, and 
roconnaissance (ISR) in vicinity 
of waterways
Target effects
Command, control, and 
communications (C3)
 
Source: Benbow, et al, 55-56 
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2. Conditions 
Changing environmental factors will affect the resources and requirements 
needed to perform a given task.  Table 3 lists those conditions outlined in the 
UJTL as well as a couple added by the CNA working group, such as Time and 
Weather.  The UJTL mentions other physical characteristics such as climate, 
foliage, and noise.   
Table 3.   Condition Categories  
Source: Benbow, et al, 57 
The UJTL and similar planning publications go into great detail to explain 
how these conditions affect functional tasks.  The CNA report creates a similar, 
yet more compact, system that takes into consideration the “primary factors that 
affect the range of desired riverine capabilities.”  The following discussion 
addresses the manner in which conditions might affect the functional tasks 
contained in Table 2 (Mobility, ISR, target effects, C3, logistics, and force 
protection). 
Mobility can be affected by natural obstacles such as rocks and heavy 
brush or by man-made counter mobility obstacles such as mines.  Also factored 
Condition categories Sub categories
Land
Maritime



















into these conditions is the organization’s access to organic resources, such as 
combat engineers, that can be used to counter these obstacles.  The resource 
requirements that arise from these conditions must also “address operating 
range, speed, maneuverability, water depth, capacity (Passenger seats, cargo 
size, weight), and hours the resource can operate.”35  
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are affected by the 
“local language, availability of non-organic sensor information, weather 
conditions (visibility), and terrain.”36  Target effects are affected by such factors 
as “availability of indirect fire support or close air support, weather and visibility, 
urban terrain features adjacent to a waterway, rules of engagement (ROE) and 
collateral damage, restrictions, and language considerations.”37 
Command, control and communications (C3) are a more abstract task.  
Conditions that can affect the completion of this task range from the structural 
composition of the organization to information flow within the chain of command 
to physical obstacles and terrain.  In addition to the examples mentioned above, 
the CNA lists the following conditions affecting C3: transmission concerns 
(foliage, urban structures, solar activity); enemy interception or jamming; 
frequency conflicts among operations; language; availability and location of re-
transmitters; distance to support base; standard operating procedures (SOP) for 
communication; and joint familiarity of terms within coordinating units.38 
As defined in the CNA report, logistics might be affected by the type of 
medical equipment needed, the length of operations before re-supply, proximity 
to basing, availability of air assets and boats for re-supply, enemy threat to 
logistical lines of communication (LOC), and ability to set up intermediate supply 
sites.  Finally, the conditions that affect force protection include: the presence of 
attack swimmers and floating mines, visual and audible watercraft signals, armor 
                                            





against direct fire or rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and availability of combat 
engineers to support survivability operations.39 
3. Standards 
The Mission-Essential Task List (METL) defines a standard as “the 
minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular task 
under a specified set of conditions.”40  Standards are further defined by 
measures and criterion.  A measure is the way to describe the varying levels of 
task performance.  For example, the task from the Marine Corps Task List 
(MCTL) 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence might measure its 
performance by the speed of information transmitted and the accuracy of 
communications.  A criterion sets the parameter for acceptable level of 
performance, encompassing factors such as time, percent, distance, number, 
and rate of movement.  The commander has the authority and responsibility to 
assess each specific mission under pertinent operational conditions.  His concept 
of operations must, therefore, determine the appropriate standards against which 
to measure mission success.41   
4. Resources 
The CNA’s discussion of resources is comparable to the military 
established assessment tool DOTMLPF.42  In the CNA’s paradigm, resource 
                                            
39 Benbow, et al. 58-59.  The manner by which conditions affect the functional tasks lie at the 
core of the “system of analysis” used by the CNA to determine the capabilities and subsequent 
gaps that currently exist.  
40 Ibid., 59 
41 “Marine Corps Task List (MCTL),” OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO 3500.26/USCG 
COMDTINST M3500.1B, (Washington: December 2005): 4-B-79.  Other definitions are attained 
from the document METL Development Information.doc, a training aid from the Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, a secured site requiring login and password.  Document is 
unclassified at http://www.cecer.army.mil/pl/project/index.cfm?RESETSITE=metl (accessed June 
14, 2007). 
42 DOTMLPF stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, and Facilities. 
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needs include “doctrine and procedures, personnel and organizations, education 
and training, and facilities, equipment, and supplies.”43   
Doctrine and procedures are the “non-material resource” that is integral to 
the planning and success of the operation.  A unit that is equipped with 
established doctrine and proven Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) is 
better poised to accomplish its objective.  The Navy itself has as episodic 
involvement with riverine operations.  This dictates that in order to assess and 
develop its capabilities it must “[update] the literature to reflect current 
operational concepts, threat projections, and technology improvements.”  More 
importantly, the CNA report concludes that the Navy must have an experimental 
test bed from which to update its doctrine and procedures.44   
The type and number of personnel in the unit is also important.  Having 
enough people in the appropriate specialties is essential to accomplishing the 
objective.  The internal and external structure of organization is also a 
determinant of success.  The organization must be task organized properly and 
its supported and supporting relationships must be clearly defined.   
Education and training must be afforded and sustained at the individual 
level for it to contribute to the unit’s capability.  This includes “specific training” 
and exercises of operational tasks to maintain an appropriate level of proficiency.  
The facilities, equipment, and supplies category includes the capability of “the 
supporting infrastructure…[the equipment’s] durability and required maintenance 
support….[and the] analysis of re-supply requirements.”45  
In summary, the CNA’s analytical method “defined a capability set as the 
ability to execute operational tasks given a set of conditions and standards set by 
 
                                            
43 Benbow, et al. 61. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 62. 
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the commander.”46  Resources allow for the employment of the capability sets in 
support of the range of military operations set by the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Committee (JROC). 
This method was applied to examine “how the Navy’s projected stand-up 
of its riverine capability” might fare against the range of military operations in 
FY07 and FY10.  At the time of the study, March 2006, the Navy’s plan called for 
an initial operational capability (IOC) of one squadron comprised of 12 boats and 
roughly 200 people by FY07.  Its full operational capability (FOC) would add two 
more squadrons bringing the total number of boats to 36 and roughly 700 people 
by FY09/FY10.47  The CNA study found that in FY07 the Navy would have a 
substantial capability to accomplish security assistance (SA), humanitarian 
assistance (HA), and counter-drug (CD) operations.  In the same timeframe, it 
would only have a limited capability to support unconventional warfare (UW), 
GWOT, and COIN.  Credible capability gaps exist in major combat operations 
(MCO), line of communication (LOC) protection (including river control and 
security), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) where the capability is 
almost negligible.  As the remaining two squadrons come on-line in FY10, 
however, capabilities that were previously negligible are all expected to improve 
to a limited capability.   
Figure 1 provided below is a summary of the CNA findings.  The CNA 
study took into account the three-year timeframe between the Navy IOC and 
attainment of FOC.  The rapidity with which RIVGRU 1 grew was not expected 
nor accounted for in the CNA assumptions.  It should not be assumed, however, 
that the early establishment of the 2 riverine squadrons necessarily correlates to 
the CNA results expected for FY10.  On the contrary, it is likely that the speed 
with which the two squadrons were brought on-line precluded the resolution of all 
                                            
46 Ibid., 63. 
47 It should be noted that Riverine Group 1 is ahead of schedule.  Its first squadron (RIVRON 
1) deployed on March 2007, RIVRON 2 was established on February 2007, and RIVRON 3 was 
scheduled to stand-up early July 2007. 
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the identified capability gaps.  Nonetheless, the scope of this thesis will focus on 
the capability gaps identified by the CNA for FY07.  
Figure 1.   Riverine Capabilities Across the Spectrum of Military Operations  
 
Source: Benbow, et al, 65 
C. GAPS ANALYSIS 
The study conducted by the CNA addressed the riverine capability gaps 
across the range of military operations for FY07 and FY10.  This section will 
concentrate on the capability gaps found for FY07 in counterinsurgency and line 
of communication operations (comprised of area security and river control).  The 
Navy’s capability to support these military operations will be limited to negligible 
in FY07.  The Navy is fortunate in that it can draw support from existing 
organizations such as the Naval Coastal Warfare Group (NCWG) and the 
Special Missions Training Center (SMTC) for training, knowledge and experience 
to support the RIVGRU requirements.  In a similar fashion, the Colombian Marine 
Corps (COLMAR) should be utilized as an extensive source of information.  The 
COLMAR riverine force, specifically, has over 50 years of experience in 
performing area security and river control against combatant guerrilla forces.  As 
such, they are poised to provide current and applicable information.  Their well-
developed TTPs as well as their innovations in equipment should be studied and 
applied where appropriate. 
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1. COIN and LOC Protection – Area Security  
The focus of this operational task is the defense of a high-value asset or 
infrastructure and would require possible execution of the following sub-tasks: 
patrol, interdiction, VBSS, and attack.  This would also include completion in 
varying degrees of all the functional tasks included in Table 2 (e.g., Mobility, ISR, 
and C3).  The requirements to accomplish this mission include protection of a 
5,000 meter area with a layered defense capable of conducting operations 24/7.  
It is assumed that sufficient boat crews and assets are employed to minimize 
risk.  In this case, four boat teams would be engaged in area security with two 
additional boat teams used as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).48  Considering 
that RIVRON 1 has 3 detachments with 4 boat teams each, for a total of twelve 
boats, this task would require the use of half of the assets assigned to the 
squadron.   
The CNA report states that the current manning and organizational 
structure proposed for the riverine group is considered to be sufficient to perform 
this task.  Once engaged in the security of this asset, however, the riverine force 
would be incapable of properly fulfilling other operational missions due to its 
small number of units.  The study also cites that doctrine is already “in place” and 
that TTPs are also “well developed;” calling for the Riverine Group to draw on 
“the experience and knowledge” of commands within the NECC as valuable 
sources of easily accessible expertise.  Though these sources of information 
should be extensively utilized, they will not provide the necessary breadth and 
depth of experience and knowledge as compared with what could be gained by a 
study of the Colombian riverine force.  None of the commands within the NECC 
have experienced combat operations to the degree and duration experienced in 
Colombia.  Colombian riverine forces have been engaged in the protection of 
ports and high value assets since their inception in the early 1950s.  For over 50 
years they have confronted a longstanding, well armed, and ruthless dissident 
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guerrilla.  In that time, they have been capable of demonstrating growth and 
proficiency by systematically establishing and protecting over 20 naval bases and 
ports along the three major rivers in Colombia and their corresponding tributaries.  
These efforts would provide the Navy’s Riverine Group with knowledge and 
experience applicable to many other current situations in the developing world. 
2. COIN and LOC Protection – River Control 
The operational task for river control, like area security, concentrates 
mainly on a defensive posture and includes the same sub-tasks and functional 
tasks: for example mobility, ISR, and C3.  Waterway security, the act of 
establishing and maintaining control, is of primary concern.  This scenario is 
designed with two basic assumptions.  First, it assumes that “the riverine 
environment is not occupied by major enemy forces.”  As friendly forces gain 
ground and exert pressure, it also assumes that the enemy force would begin to 
make use of the inland waterways for “transportation, communication, and 
escape and evasion routes.”49  The manner in which the CNA constructed this 
scenario made it explicitly analogous to the environment that the Colombian 
riverine force has been engaged in for the last 50 years.   
The resources and capability gaps afflicting area security also affect the 
river control mission, but are even more severe.  Personnel and organization will 
be undermanned as six boats are engaged in area security and only one 
detachment will remain to conduct river control.  The length of river segment that 
can be effectively controlled is severely diminished due to this lack of assets.  
Colombian riverine operations could provide an important gauge to determine the 
required assets necessary to conduct this operation efficiently.  Currently, their 
riverine forces employ a structure similar to that of U.S. forces, making it easy to 
apply direct comparison.  Despite this, their areas of control are divided into 
smaller elements differing in length and forces assigned – variations that might 
prove instructive for the United States.  The riverine area in the Pacific, for 
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example, expands 102 kilometers and includes the rivers Patia, Mira, Guapi, San 
Juan, and Baudo and two brigade size units.  A look into how they use their 
forces and to what effect would prove fruitful.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Navy has entered a new phase in its history.  The changes in the 
national state of affairs prompted adequate and corresponding changes to make 
the naval force current and relevant.  A key aspect of this shift was the CNO 
directed creation of the U.S. Naval riverine force.  As with any other change, the 
Navy expected various obstacles to arise.  These obstacles were defined by the 
CNA study as capability gaps inherent to the timeline and available resources 
devoted to the development of this new force.  Capability gaps were identified to 
be significant in the areas of river control and area security and this thesis 
focuses on redressing these gaps. 
Addressing these gaps will be a major undertaking with significant 
consequences for the Riverine Group.  The Colombian riverine force and its 
experience stand as a suitable source of credible, established, and current 
information.  A look into its TTPs, use of equipment, and manner in which they 
conduct operations across the range of military operations (ROMO) would be 
beneficial for the proper development of the U.S. riverine force.  An in-depth look 
into their rich history against a world renown and competent foe could garner 
useful lessons. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF COLOMBIAN RIVERINE FORCES 
The Colombian riverine forces have been at the service of the country for 
over 50 years.  From the creation of the “Flotilla Avispa” (Wasp Flotilla) in 1956 to 
the current force structure, theirs has been a struggle to adapt and evolve with 
every national crisis.  The riverine force forms an integral component of the 
Colombian Marine Corps (COLMAR).  The COLMAR, since their most recent 
establishment in 1937, has in turn been a subset of the Colombian Navy.  In 
order to understand the current riverine force, it is important to first go back and 
look at its history.  This chapter will be divided into two separate sections.  The 
first section will present a timeline of key events in the history of Colombia and 
indicate the corresponding riverine transformation associated with each.  Four 
specific events will be addressed: the period of La Violencia that took place from 
1948 to 1957; the rise of the revolutionary groups like the ELN and FARC during 
the 1960s and 1970s; the rise and fall of the drug cartels during the 1980s and 
90’s, respectively; and finally the evolution of what is currently referred to as 
narco-terrorism during the 1990s to the present.  The second section will 
describe the riverine force structure as it stands today, with a focus on their units 
and their capabilities.   
By looking back into their history, one can begin to understand the 
progression in transformation that this force has accomplished.  The force has 
not been dismantled after every conflict but instead has augmented its 
capabilities over time to deal with diverse threats.   As a result, the force currently 
possesses an institutional memory that envelops over fifty years of actively 
engaged experience.  As chapter 4 will show, these events and circumstances 
comprise finite points of a greater tale that has led the Colombian riverine force 
to become one of the most effective and largest in the world.   
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A. EVOLUTIONARY RESPONSE TO THREATS  
The history and development of the Colombian Marine Infantry dates back 
to the War of Independence that began in 1810.  The call for liberation from 
colonial Spain was lead mainly by Simón Bolívar and Francisco José de Paula 
Santander.  These leaders quickly recognized the need for an amphibious force 
capable of exerting power from the sea which led to the prompt formation of a 
marine infantry.  By November 22, 1812, the improvised force received a baptism 
by fire as they sailed from Cartagena and successfully captured the towns of 
Tolú and Cispatá.  Several victories followed through their many engagements in 
regions such as the Magdalena River and Caribbean coast.  Their utility and 
success was rewarded by an increase in capital ships and marine infantrymen as 
they sought greater participation in major operations.  Their pinnacle contribution 
came in the decisive victory over the Spanish during the Battle of Maracaibo on 
July 24, 1823.50  Their heroic involvement and contribution is considered vital to 
the initial consolidation of Gran Colombia.   
Nearly two decades later, the country would find itself in the throes of 
another crisis, this time internal in nature.  Political and military jealousies 
between the Liberal and Conservative parties within Colombia had been afflicting 
the country since the 1830s.  These political battles reached a zenith in 1840 and 
launched the country into civil war.  The country suffered severe consequences 
that affected its “nascent industrial development, disrupted trade, and 
discouraged local enterprise.”51  The country plunged into an economic crisis.  
As a result, the government of General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera decreed 
the suppression of the Colombian Naval Armada and subsequently the 
dispersion of the marine infantry on November 25, 1845.52  All the ships 
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belonging to the Colombian Armada were disarmed and sold at public auction 
and its marine personnel were retired.53  
It took nearly one century before the country would find the need to 
reconstitute its marine forces.  In September 1932, a group of civilians from Perú 
took by surprise the town of Leticia capturing all the Colombians therein.  The 
preceding years of internal struggles had distracted the country from issues 
concerning external defense.  Finding itself unprepared, Colombia would quickly 
have to assemble a maritime force and a marine infantry to reclaim its 
sovereignty.  The new flotilla, under the command of General Alfredo Vázquez 
Cobo, included two bombardment units (Santa Marta and Cartagena), four 
motorized boats, 12 row-boats, and one transport unit (Sinchi Roca).  The 
military detachment assembled in the Putumayo River included 1,858 men.54  
The amphibious assault that followed, aided by the aerial support of six aircraft, 
quickly defeated the entrenched Peruvian forces at Fort Güepi.  By March 1933, 
Colombia had regained its lost territory.  Most importantly, the country was again 
reminded of the value and need of an amphibious force capable of safeguarding 
the integrity of its national borders.   
On April 29, 1936, Congress approved law 105 which, under Chapter VIII, 
provided the fundamental framework for the creation of a Marine Infantry.  
Decrees No. 50 and No. 93, of January 12 and 14, 1937, respectively, formalized 
the Marine Infantry of Colombia and mandated the formation of two Companies 
each assigned to Naval Base MC “Bolivar” and Port Ospina along the 
Putumayo.55  These congressional decrees allowed for the growth and 
consolidation of the Colombian Marine Corps as a viable component of the 
armed forces.  Their strong roots based in defense of the country provided the 
foundation from which the riverine forces would emerge nearly two decades later. 
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1. La Violencia 
The same political turmoil between Liberals and Conservatives that 
afflicted the country in the early 1830s flared up once again in 1940s Colombia.  
The struggle between the two political adversaries had been brewing since the 
early 1920s and revolved primarily around land reform.  The presidency of 
Liberal Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-1938) promoted a series of reforms that 
used occupancy as the basis for peasant rights to property, thus allowing 
squatters the opportunity to gain unused land.56  These types of policies were 
meant to decrease the inequality gap between the haves and have-nots.  
Instead, they increased the already fervent alienation and social rift between the 
peasantry and the landed elite.  The Conservatives, for their part, drew much 
opposition for their role in the suppression of labor unions.  They were vilified 
following their involvement with the United Fruit Company against the banana 
unions in 1928. 
The 1930s and early 1940s was politically dominated by the Liberal party.  
The elections of 1946 divided the Liberal party between Gabriel Turbay and 
Jorge Eliéser Gaitán.  Gaitan’s presidential bid for the presidency proposed 
abandoning “Colombia’s semi-feudal economy in favor of workers and 
campesinos” with a strong focus on land and labor rights.57  The politically 
alienated Conservatives took advantage of this fissure in the Liberal vote and 
secured an electoral victory.  The ascent to the presidency of Conservative 
Mariano Ospina Pérez in 1946 opened the door to a “series of crude reprisals 
against the Liberals.”58  The retribution from a decade long political sidelining, 
biased policies, and abuses achieved new heights on April 9, 1948.  On a day 
that would later become known as the Bogotázo, Liberal candidate Jorge Gaitán 
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was shot to death in broad daylight on the streets of Bogotá.  This event 
polarized the citizenry.  Revolts in Bogotá were widespread costing the city 
nearly $570 million dollars in damages.59  In the country side, the event 
galvanized the rural populace and a series of armed bands began to form.  By 
1952, these gangs grew in numbers and aggressiveness, often engaging with 
formal guerrilla tactics.  From the Colombian military perspective, the armed 
groups along the Llanos Orientales (Eastern Plains) of Colombia were nearly 
uncontrollable.60   
The Colombian Armada, up until that time, was the service least involved 
in the internal political problems of the country.  As a result, the national 
government assigned them the mission of “restoring the order and guaranteeing 
the peace along the rivers along the eastern plains.”61  Institutionally, the 
Colombian Armada created the Commando de la Fuerza Naval de Oriente 
(FNO).  Two marine infantry platoons were assigned to the region equipped with 
transport ships, canon boats (cañoneros) and motor boats.  Soon after, the Naval 
Base ARC “Santander,” along the river Meta, and the Advanced Post Puerto 
Carreño were created (see Figure 2).  By 1955, the National Police and Army 
removed a high percent of their troops leaving the Navy with sole jurisdiction of 
the oriental region.62  In addition, the Armada and its marines were also serving 
important functions along the southern rivers of the country.  It was from this 
region and through the initiative of two marine officers that a new capability would 
be introduced into the Colombian Armada.  Marine Captain Aurelio Castrillón 
Muñoz and Lieutenant Rafael Grau Araujo were both assigned to Port 
Leguízamo along the shores of the river Putumayo.63  In September, 1956, in an 
exhibition on the same river, they demonstrated the increased velocity and 
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maneuverability capabilities gained by using small armed boats and hence 
marked the beginning of the Colombian riverine history.   
What later became known as the “Flotilla Avispa” (Wasp Flotilla) was 
comprised of 7 small armed boats (see Figure 3); six boats would form the task 
force and one would function for command and control.  The boats used were 
made of aluminum, 13 feet long, capable of carrying over 1700 pounds of cargo 
(800 kilos) and manned by six marines.  The armament included; 60 and 81 
millimeter mortars; .30 caliber Browning M-1919 machine guns; MK-2 hand 
grenades and grenade launchers; Garant M-1 rifles; and 9 millimeter pistols.64  
Their newfound capability allowed them to better confront the rising 
problem of armed gangs in the countryside. They maintained this rudimentary 7 
ship organization until 1971 when the force organization and equipment were no 
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Figure 2.   Political Map of Colombia  
 
Source: Paul F Willey. The Art of Riverine Warfare from an Asymmetrical Approach 




Figure 3.   Boats of the Flotilla Avispa  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia.  La Infantería de Marina en la Historia de 
Colombia, (Colombia, June 2006): 76 
2. Armed Revolutionary Groups 
The period of La Violencia that began in 1948 had a significant impact on 
Colombia.  Though this period is said to have ended in 1957 with the Declaration 
of Sitges and the formation of the National Front government65, over 200,000 
lives were lost in just over nine years of struggle.  Most importantly, this era of 
violence brought forth the formation of guerrilla movements that would endure to 
this day.66   
By 1964 two distinctly different revolutionary guerrilla groups had formed, 
both with the mainstay of their support rooted with the peasantry in the 
countryside.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was officially 
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formed in response to the attacks on the town of Marquetalia.67  From this valley 
a group of nearly 100 peasants escaped a military attack and joined others in the 
“liberated zones” of the southern countryside becoming mobile guerrilla groups.  
While the FARC was influenced by the Communist Party, The Army of National 
Liberation (ELN) was heavily influenced by the Cuban revolution.  Led mainly by 
student radicals organized around Santander and Cauca, this group exerted their 
presence in rural areas of the northern regions.   
The era of the National Front brought superficial stability by reducing 
political infighting.  Societal violence, nonetheless, was clearly delineated along 
class lines and continued to increase.  The existence of two established 
subversive groups trained in guerrilla tactics provided the government with a 
more formidable opponent.  As a result, the Ministry of War sought to once again 
“make use of the Marines…in the control of national order.”68  By the 1970’s 
Marine units had a presence in 10 forward stations including Tumaco, 
Buenaventura, Cartagena, Bogotá, and various other ports.  The riverine force of 
the “Flotilla Avispa” would also experience a transformation.  Congressional 
Resolution No. 8511, enacted on December 14, 1971, approved the creation of 
the “Comandos de Selva” (Jungle Commandos).  The end of the decade saw the 
emergence of a unit of amphibious troops that could operate along the rivers 
(see Figure 4).  The Jungle Commandos would receive psychological, tactical, 
and technical training specific for riverine combat.  The decade of the 1970s 
became better known as the time of “War on the Rivers.”  Among the many 
battles fought by the Jungle Commandos, Operation Anorí in 1973 was their 
most successful in that they nearly eliminated the National Liberation Army 
(ELN).69  By the end of the decade the Colombian Marine Corps had grown to 
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the size of a Brigade comprised of four rifle battalions, a training base in 
Coveñas, and a Non-Commissioned Officer training school.70  Concurrently, the 
riverine force had grown to eight riverine elements that deployed along the 
Magdalena, Cauca, Meta, Guaviare, Inírida, Putumayo, Caguán, and Orteguaza 
rivers.  
Figure 4.   Jungle Commandos  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia.  La Infantería de Marina en la Historia de 
Colombia, (Colombia, June 2006): 85, http://www.armada.mil.co/ (accessed October 28, 2007) 
3. Drug Cartels 
The end of the National Front government came in 1974.  The return to 
competitive elections between the Liberal and Conservative parties was relatively 
smooth.  Following the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) efforts of the 1960s, many 
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analysts and the government thought the rural guerrilla problem had been largely 
resolved by the early 1970s.  The following decade would prove otherwise.   
Narcotics took center stage by the 1980s as Colombia took on the role of 
the main supplier of cocaine to the international drug market.  Increased 
interdiction efforts launched by the Mexican government in 1975 allowed 
Colombia to gain nearly 70 percent of the marijuana trade entering the United 
States.  With this niche safely secured, the drug cartels of Medellín and Cali 
turned their attention to cocaine and made Colombia the “intermediary production 
and distribution center.”71  Coca leaf, grown in the neighboring countries of Perú 
and Bolivia, would enter Colombia from the south for processing.  The chemicals 
used in processing were smuggled from the United States, Europe and China.  
Once the processing was complete, large quantities of cocaine would leave the 
country via the Caribbean en-route back to the United States and Europe.72  The 
river systems of the country, its coastal waters and access to the sea were 
integral to this process.  
The government understood clearly the importance of the water 
environment and turned again to the Navy and its Marine Corps to regain control 
of outlying areas of the country.  Accordingly, the Navy was given the 
responsibility for 2900 kilometers of land along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, 
the southern and eastern borders, as well as the entire network of rivers.73  In 
1979, specifically, the Marine Infantry assumed responsibility for all the riverine 
waterways within Colombia (see Figure 4).74  The country has an extensive 
riverine structure that is composed of 30 principal navigable rivers and 68 
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principal river mouths.  These form part of a 15,774 kilometers-long network of 
rivers, of which 12,660 kilometers are navigable.75   
Figure 5.   Naval Responsibilities  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 14 
Colombia’s diverse geographical make-up of jungles, mountains, and river 
systems that cover over 50 percent of the country, “make it an ideal haven for 
illicit products and means.”76  To better understand the riverine environment of 
Colombia, the country can be divided into an Eastern and Western region.  From 
Figure 6 one can begin to understand the expanse of the Colombian river 
system.  Its lack of a road infrastructure makes the fluvial waterways the principal 
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route of transportation for illicit activities within the Eastern territory.  The Jungle 
Commandos of 1971 were initially deployed to the area in the Guaviare, Meta, 
and Orinoco rivers.  They were tasked to regain control of this guerrilla-occupied 
territory “where there had never before been state presence.”77   
Figure 6.   Colombian River Systems and Transportation System  
 
Source: “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group (Bogotá, 
Colombia: January 2006): 3 
The addition of drug cartels to the already existing problem of the 
guerrillas, however, meant that the Jungle Commandos would have to undergo 
another change to confront their new enemies.  Therefore, in 1980, under the 
direction of Brigadier General Numa Pompilio Rojas Currea, the small riverine 
fleet began to change its structure and organization.  The 13-foot aluminum 
boats acquired in 1956 were replaced by 13 and 17-foot boats made of fiberglass 
                                            
77 “Historical Review of the Colombian Marine Corps,” translated by U.S. Military Group 
Colombia (Colombia, January 2007): 2. 
 42
and given stronger 55 horse-power engines.  More significantly, the basic combat 
element of the riverine force would be comprised of four tactical boats (13-foot 
boats) and one logistical and administrative unit (a 17-foot boat).78  The riverine 
combat school would adjust its tactics and doctrine to accommodate the new 
basic fighting element.  By 1981 the formal re-designation of the Jungle 
Commandos to Riverine Combat Element (Elemento de Combate Fluvial ECF) 
completed the transformation and closed another distinguished chapter of 
Colombian riverine history.     
By 1989, the new Colombian riverine force had grown to 18 riverine 
combat elements and was active over a great part of Colombia’s river system.  
Also in 1989, the United States became heavily involved in Colombia as part of 
its longstanding War on Drugs.  Under the Andean Initiative, the U.S. Marine 
Corps (USMC) reinvigorated the Colombian Riverine Program.79  Under this 
program the Colombian Marines (COLMAR) received U.S. assistance in “boat 
procurement, riverine seminars, infrastructure development, and establishing a 
new Colombian riverine school.”80   
4. Narco-terrorism 
The Colombian struggle of the 1980s and 1990s against the drug cartels 
came at a high cost of human life from both the civilian and military sectors.  The 
U.S. entrance into the conflict near the end of 1989 changed the way Colombia 
would confront its war on drugs.  From 1990 to 1998 they would concentrate on 
attacking the leadership of the cartels of Medellín, Cali, and the Caribbean coast.  
By 1994 they had become largely successful in diminishing the power and 
presence of the cartels, which were soon replaced by smaller, more mobile and 
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internationally connected networks.81  These became inconsequential by 
comparison to the gains made by the revolutionary guerrilla groups.  In 
Colombia, the destruction of the cartels created a power vacuum prime for the 
already established guerrillas like the FARC and ELN to step into.  Their 
presence created an “explosion in the cultivation of coca and the production of 
narcotics.”82  By taking over some of the operations of the cartels, the guerrillas 
acquired a lucrative funding source that allowed them to increase their military 
strength.  The Colombian Ministry of Defense calculated that the FARC grew 
from 5,800 members in 1990 to 11,930 members by 1998.83  The resurgent 
predominance of the guerrillas led to a corresponding increase in the size and 
number of paramilitary groups, comprised of a mix of peasants, landowners, and 
drug traffickers.  The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia or AUC), formed in April 1997, battled guerrillas for control 
over the drug trade and by and large was responsible for more deaths than either 
leftist guerrilla group.   Political murder, assassination, bombings, extortion, and 
kidnappings became the norm.  
In August 1998 Andrés Pastrana, a member of the Conservative Party, 
won the presidency by defeating Liberal contender Horacio Serpa.  His platform 
advocated the peaceful resolution to the internal civil conflicts of Colombia and 
full cooperation with the United States in the war on drugs.  By the end of 1999, 
President Pastrana unveiled Plan Colombia.  This integrated strategy looked to 
“restore security, strengthen the justice system, eradicate coca cultivation, 
develop the infrastructure and economy, and restore social order and peace in 
Colombia.”84  The plan also drew greater financial and direct support from the 
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United States.  Since three of these goals were directly supported by the 
Colombian riverine forces, Plan Colombia would lead the force to undergo its 
latest transformation.    
On August 4, 1999, Puerto Leguízamo, along the river Putumayo, became 
the stage in the inaugural ceremony of the first Marine Infantry Riverine Brigade.  
This ceremony, attended by President Pastrana, was of historic significance.  
The new Riverine Brigade united the 30 existing riverine combat elements (RCE) 
and 9 deployed detachments into five riverine battalions85 and was given total 
responsibility for the riverine security in Colombia.  With this act, the Riverine 
Force was transformed from an operational arm of the Marine Infantry into a 
national strategic entity.86  
B. CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE 
The events of 1999 constitute the latest installment in a series of changes 
that shaped the current structure of the Colombian riverine force.  Since 1999, 
the Colombian Riverine Force has increased in size and is organized to include 
two Riverine Brigades with eight Riverine Battalions (BAFLIM), three Riverine 
Assault Battalions (BASFLIM), 63 Riverine Combat Elements (ECF), and 
Advanced Riverine Posts (PFA) and naval bases used for logistical support.87  
The first segment of this section examines the riverine units, their method of 
employment and their characteristics.  The second summarizes the forces’ 
various operational and organizational structures.   
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1. Units and their characteristics 
The Colombian riverine force contains two types of units differentiated by 
size and capacity.  The units of large displacement and greater capacity include 
the Riverine Gunboats (Cañonero Fluvial CF) and both the Heavy Riverine 
Support Patrol Boat (Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial Pesado PAFP) and the Light 
(Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial Liviano PAFL).  Their main purpose is to provide 
logistical support and troop transport and to facilitate operations of long duration 
and autonomy.  The smaller riverine vessels include the Riverine Patrol Boat 
(Patrulleras Fluviales PF), the Fast Riverine Patrol Boat (Patrulleras Rápidas 
Fluviales PRF), Armored Troop Carriers (Transportes Blindados de Tropa TBT), 
tugboats (Remolcadores Fluviales RF), the Riverine Combat Elements Heavy 
(Elemento de Combate Fluvial Pesado ECFP) and Light (Elemento de Combate 
Fluvial Liviano ECFL), Riverine Support Boats (Botes de Apoyo Fluvial BAF), and 
Riverine Support Stations (Estación Móvil de Apoyo Fluvial EMAF).88  
The Riverine Gunboats (Cañonero Fluvial CF) currently operating in 
Colombia date back to 1956 and the times of the Flotilla Avispa.  There are 
currently three in service: ARC Arauca, ARC Riohacha, and ARC Leticia.  After 
50 years of service, these units are capable of providing medical support to the 
troops and basic repair for the Riverine Combat Elements (Elemento de 
Combate Fluvial ECF).  They provide troop transport for up to one platoon of 
marines.  These units can remain autonomous for 30 days and can best serve as 
a Command and Control platform for continuous joint operations.  Though they 
are used in conjunction with ECFs, these gunboats can only carry 2,000 gallons 
of gasoline, thus limiting the operational range of the combat elements.  Their 
armament includes two MK-19 grenade launchers, two .50 caliber machineguns, 
and two cannons (40 and 50 millimeter shells).  Their greatest weakness, 
however, stems from their lack of maneuverability, speed, and protective armor.  
As such, they are extremely vulnerable when ambushed or under enemy fire, 
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and require good intelligence and land support when trying to control riverine 
lines of communication (LOC).89    
The Heavy Riverine Support Patrol Boat (Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial 
Pesada PAFP) is frequently referred to by its more common name Nodriza (see 
Figure 7).  These boats perform several integral combat functions of security, 
control, riverine interdiction operations, and logistic support.  They form part of a 
Riverine Combat Group and provide direct support to the Riverine Combat 
Elements.  Much like the Riverine Gunboats, these vessels provide an infirmary 
for troops, engine repair capabilities, and can function as a Command and 
Control platform.  The design also includes a landing platform for mid-sized 
helicopters.  This makes the PAFP an excellent asset for medical evacuation as 
well as joint operations requiring aerial support.  These units have served well 
during the initial engagements along the principal rivers.  This success, however, 
prompted a shift by the guerrillas away from the principal waterways and into the 
more shallow and narrow primary and secondary tributaries.  The boat’s 
minimum draft of 0.75 meters (2.5 feet) forced a shift to the use of lighter units.  
The Light Riverine Support Patrol Boats reduced their draft to 0.40 meters, or 
nearly one foot, making them capable of engaging the enemy in shallower rivers.  
Both type vessels are restricted by their maximum velocity which ranges from 9 
to 12 knots.  This is compensated, however, by their heavily reinforced armored 
shell and overwhelming fire power.  Each unit only requires a complement of 16 
officers and enlisted personnel to operate.  It is capable of housing and 
sustaining 39 fully equipped troops for up to 15 days.  This, and its 1800 nautical 
mile range, makes it a superbly capable unit apt for the riverine environment.9091  
For various reasons, the PAFP is considered a success story in the evolution of 
Colombian riverine history.  Chapter IV will provide greater detail as to the 
development and capabilities of this unit. 
                                            
89 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 20. 
90 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, 46. 
 47
Figure 7.   Riverine Support Patrol Boat Heavy  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, Revista 
Armada (Colombia, June 2007): 46 
The Fast Riverine Patrol Boats (Patrulleras Rápidas Fluviales PRF) are 
divided into three classes: the Río Class (PRF-CR), the Tenerife Class (PRF-CT) 
and the Magdalena Class (PRF-CM).  There are currently 3 Río Class fast patrol 
boats, 9 Tenerife and 16 Magdalena units in the Colombian inventory.92  These 
types of boats were used by the United States during Vietnam.  Today, they 
usually form part of a Riverine Combat Group (GCF) and are tasked and 
accomplish the same missions as the Heavy Riverine Support Patrol Boat 
(Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial Pesado PAFP).  Unlike the PAFPs, however, these 
vessels are light and have a shallower draft. The PRF’s size and draft allow it to 
                                            
91 CF Jaime Hernando Jiménez, Commercial Department Manager-COTECMAR.  
Interviewed by author, (Colombia, September 17, 2007). 
92 “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group Colombia (Bogotá: 
Colombia, 9 January 2006). 
 48
navigate along most of the primary tributaries of the country.  Unfortunately, they 
are not heavily armored and do not provide much protection to the embarked 
elements.  Their maximum speed, depending on the type of unit, ranges from 8 
to 16 knots making it extremely vulnerable in narrow rivers where 
maneuverability is restricted.93   
Figure 8.   Fast Riverine Patrol Boat (PRF-CT)  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, Revista 
Armada (Colombia, June 2007): 47 
The Armored Troop Carriers (Transportes Blindados de Tropa TBT), 
Tugboats (Remolcadores Fluviales RF), and Riverine Support Boats (Botes de 
Apoyo Fluvial BAF) function as their name implies.  The TBTs have a maximum 
velocity of 26 knots and provide transport, including embarkation and debarkation 
capabilities, to 14 fully equipped troops.  These units are equipped with one M-79 
grenade launcher, two M-60 machineguns, and five assault rifles.  The tugboats 
are capable of transporting troops (up to 12 fully equipped), goods and fuel.  
They mainly operate as a support unit for the Advanced Riverine Posts (Puesto 
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Fluvial Avanzado PFA).  Their functions are limited to the riverine environment.94  
The BAF is capable of transporting troops, fuel, ammunition, and food to land 
units in places where the Riverine Support Patrol Boat (Patrullera de Apoyo 
Fluvial PAF) cannot reach due to its size.  The boat itself is not armored nor does 
it have much firepower.  As a result, it requires an escort to conduct its mission.  
The Riverine Combat Element is the basic building block of the Colombian 
Riverine Force.  There are two types of Riverine Combat Elements that, 
depending on their technical and tactical characteristics, can be characterized as 
Heavy or Light.  Both provide “speed, maneuverability, flexibility and firepower, 
[and] adaptability.”95  Their primary task is to provide riverine control by executing 
interdiction and assault operations.  As a result, these vessels are highly 
susceptible to attack and ambush.96  The ECFs are the tactical combat units and 
cannot provide a reconnaissance function.  Their greatest limitation is their fuel 
consumption.  Figure 9 depicts the standard make-up of a Heavy Riverine 
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95 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 38. 
96 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, 47. 
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Figure 9.   Riverine Combat Element  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. La Armada Nacional en la Guerra Contra el 
Narcotrafico, (Colombia. April 2004): 21 
The Heavy Riverine Combat Element (ECFP) is made up of three tactical 
boats and one boat in charge of command and control (C2) (see Figure 10).  
There are two types of tactical and C2 boats.  The 25 foot command and control 
boat is essentially a larger and slightly improved version of the 22 foot tactical 
boat.  Both vessels carry the same name, Piraña, have a fiber glass hull and 
were built in the United States.  Their main propulsion consists of two outboard 
motors of 150 to 175 horsepower that can reach a maximum speed of 32 to 37 
knots.  The bigger 25 foot Piraña can remain on station for 7 hours at maximum 
velocity, one hour longer than its smaller counterpart.  Their size and power give 
these craft great maneuverability.  The armament onboard -- composed of .50 
caliber and 7.62 millimeter machineguns, two grenade launchers (smoke and 
fragmentary), and six rifles -- gives the Piraña great lethality.  The second type of 
tactical and C2 boats both carry the namesake Caribe.  Just like the Piraña, the 
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26 foot C2 boat is an improved version of the 23 foot tactical vessel.  These 
boats are both built in Colombia, are made of fiber glass, and carry two outboard 
motors that can reach up to 35 knots.  Their firepower is the same as the Piraña, 
but both Caribe type boats time on station is slightly longer at 8 hours.97  
Figure 10.   Command and Control Boat  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, Revista 
Armada (Colombia, June 2007): 47 
The Light Riverine Combat Element (ECFL) (see Figure 11) is a special 
type of unit that is capable of conducting operations in shallow and more 
restricted waterways because of its shallow draft.  This capability allows these 
units to conduct operations during dry or wet seasons (winter or summer).  Each 
element is comprised of four 17-foot tactical boats each with two 40 horsepower 
outboard motors.  These units are employed for special operations, day or night.  
Normally they form part of a Riverine Combat Group (GCF) and provide the 
following capabilities.  They provide support in line of communication (LOC) 
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operations and they act as escort for units conducting transport or logistical 
support, and units performing ground troop insertion operations.98  Their low fuel 
consumption and ease of transportation into different theaters of operation make 
them extremely affordable and tactically useful.   
The ECFL is limited to quick-strike and assault operations.  Its limited 
capacity to carry supplies, munitions, and fuel reduces its autonomy and ability to 
conduct secondary operations.  The operational success hinges greatly on the 
element of surprise and consequently on the quality of intelligence.  Due to its 
size, low firepower, and lack of speed this unit is highly vulnerable if it comes 
under direct fire or if confronted with an ambush situation.   
Figure 11.   Riverine Combat Element Light  
 
Source: “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group Colombia (Bogotá: 
Colombia, 9 January 2006 
Of the units that perform support functions, the Riverine Support Mobile 
Station (Estación Móvil de Apoyo Fluvial EMAF) is an innovation worth noting 
(see Figure 12).  The EMAFs are an asset designed, developed, and built in 
Colombia.  These floating hangars entered the force in 2002 as part of the 
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Riverine Battalion No. 50 in Port Inírida.99  In just over five years they have 
increased in number to 12 and seen drastic improvements on the initial design.  
The EMAF is capable of housing the 25 marines of an ECF and their four boats 
in addition to one platoon of combat ready marines.  The hangar serves as a 
logistic, medical, and sanitary support unit that is also capable of conducting 
basic engine repair.100  The unit can be easily transported via tugboats and 
provide the riverine force with a rapid and inexpensive forward staging capability 
from which to launch future operations.  Additionally, its presence downriver in 
areas where permanent infrastructure cannot be established is a welcoming sight 
to marines seeking rest or refuge following combat.101 
Figure 12.   Riverine Support Mobile Station  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, Revista 
Armada (Colombia, June 2007): 48 
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2. Organizational Structures  
The Marine Infantry underwent two major reorganizations in the last 
decade, one in 1999 and the other in 2004.  In 1999, the Riverine Brigade was a 
subordinate command under the Marine Infantry Brigade.  By 2004, the riverine 
force nearly doubled in numbers, noted by the formation of the second brigade, 
and gained greater notoriety and importance.  This was clearly evident when in 
2004 both Riverine Brigades attained the equivalent status of the Infantry 
Brigade and became subordinate to no other command than that of the General 
Commander of the Marine Infantry (see Figure 13).102  To date, the two Riverine 
Brigades are comprised of a total of eight Riverine Battalions and three Riverine 
Assault Battalions.   
The Marine Infantry Riverine Brigade (Brigada Fluvial de Infantería de 
Marina BRIFLIM) is an operational unit that is in charge of providing support to 
the Army when required, exercising control of the rivers, and maintaining 
Colombia’s sovereignty along its riverine borders.  At its core, each BRIFLIM 
command is comprised of Riverine Battalions (Batallon Fluvial de Infantería de 
Marina BAFLIM) and Riverine Assault Battalions (Batallon de Asalto Fluvial de 
Infantería de Marina BASFLIM). 
The Riverine Battalion is a tactical component of the BRIFLIM.  The 
BAFLIM is composed of one Advanced Riverine Post and has the ability to form 
Riverine Combat Groups.  Riverine Combat Groups are by nature temporary.  
They are comprised of one Gunboat or one Riverine Patrol Support Boat, two 
Riverine Combat Elements, and one Riverine Assault Group. 
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Figure 13.   Colombian Marine Infantry Structure103  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. La Infantería de Marina en la Historia de 
Colombia, (Colombia, June 2006): 51 
The Advance Riverine Post (Puesto Fluvial Avanzado PFA) is an organic 
unit of the BAFLIM.  This post has a defined riverine area of responsibility.  Its 
purpose is to maintain the lines of communication (LOC), maintain control of the 
rivers along a strategic area, and serve as a launching base for other operations.  
A PFA will execute some of the tactical missions of larger commands, such as a 
BAFLIM.  As such, it must possess security and defense systems, provide a 
credible riverine force, and have the sufficient combat power to be decisive in 
battle.104 
A Riverine Combat Group (Grupo de Combate Fluvial GCF) (see Figure 
14) is organized solely for combat.  Its command and control platform will be one 
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riverine boat type -- CF, PAFP, PAFL, or PRF.  Additionally, it will contain two 
Riverine Combat Elements (ECFP or ECFL), one to two Riverine Assault 
Groups,105 and one Riverine Support Boat for troop transport.106   
Figure 14.   Riverine Combat Group  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. La Armada Nacional en la Guerra Contra el 
Narcotrafico, (Colombia. April 2004): 22 
Once formed, a GCF provides the BAFLIM with various capabilities.  
These capabilities include:  
• Establish and maintain control of the riverine lines of 
communication (LOC). 
• Perform interdiction and security operations as well as assault and 
support operations. 
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• Provide direct fire support to land and riverine units.  
• Transport units, material and fuel. 
• Conduct night insertion operations. 
The GCF is limited by its size making it only able to conduct operations 
during summer months (wet periods) and in riverine areas with enough depth 
and width for all its units.  If operational requirements make it necessary to enter 
restricted waters, then the GCF requires absolute control of the land area along 
the rivers or the support of air assets to neutralize enemy action.107    
Riverine Assault Battalions (Batallon de Asalto Fluvial de Infantería de 
Marina BASFLIM) are also tactical in nature. This element is responsible for land 
operations in support of riverine operations.  There are two types of BASFLIM.  
Both, type A and B, are mainly composed of four Riverine Assault Companies.  
Their difference resides in the size of their security and support units; type B is 
larger than type A.108 Figure 15 below shows the locations of each BRIFLIM, 
BAFLIM, and BASFLIM.  Each battalion is strategically placed along the main 
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Figure 15.   Riverine Brigades and Battalions  
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, Revista 
Armada, (Colombia, June 2007): 25 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The history of the Colombian Marine Infantry dates back over 70 years to 
January 1937.  It took nearly two decades and a struggle of the magnitude and 
complexity of La Violencia to prompt Colombia into creating a riverine force.  
Since 1956 and the creation of the Flotilla Avispa, it is evident that Colombia’s 
Riverine Force has been closely tied to the political and social history of the 
country.  One need only look at the timeline of significant events that have 
transpired in Colombia to recognize the corresponding and reactionary 
development and evolution of the riverine force.  Over their 50 year history, the 
Colombian riverine force have evolved to face a series of diverse threats, ranging 
from armed peasant uprisings, to organized and well funded subversive 
guerrillas, to ruthless drug cartels, and narco-terrorist organizations.  
At each stage of crisis, the Colombia government recognized the need for 
a riverine solution.  Consequently, nearly after each passing decade the riverine 
force experienced an increase in manning and a redefinition of its 
responsibilities.  Notably, in their 50 year history, the Colombian Riverine Forces 
have not been disbanded nor reduced to inoperable numbers.  As a 
consequence, this has allowed for a continuous and gradual development of a 
formidable force with an incredible wealth of institutional knowledge present 
within the system. 
The following chapter will discuss Colombia’s tactical and operational 
application of its riverine forces in their largely successful effort to regain control 
of the riverways from their latest adversaries as well as some of the innovations 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF RIVERINE OPERATIONS, 2002-2006 
The unveiling of Plan Colombia by the Pastrana administration in 1999 
had a significant effect on the development of the Colombian Riverine Force.  
Plan Colombia allowed for the development of a Riverine Brigade that unified the 
country’s Riverine Combat Elements and formalized its ranks into five combat 
oriented battalions.  In the three years that followed, however, the riverine forces, 
or any other military branch of government for that matter, were not used to their 
maximum effectiveness.  The Colombian government at that time had placed 
negotiated peace with the guerrillas as the principal political objective.  As a 
result, appeasing gestures like creating a 40,000 square kilometer 
demilitarization zone (Zona de Despeje) in the states of Meta and Caquetá 
became the primary vehicles for peace.  The continuing offensives by the FARC 
combined with hijackings, high profile kidnappings, and murders, proved that 
dialogue with an emboldened enemy were futile.  By the end of his term, much of 
the peace initiatives envisioned by President Pastrana had failed.  Colombia saw 
its economy at a standstill and its security much more threatened than before.  
President Pastrana’s approval rating drop, from 67 percent to nearly 30 percent, 
was a clear signal that the Colombian people were dissatisfied with the status 
quo and were in need of a new vision.109 
On May 2002, Álvaro Uribe won the Colombian presidential election with 
over 50 percent of the vote.  He ran his candidacy as an independent liberal with 
a platform focused on confronting the national ailments caused by illegal 
organizations such as the FARC, the AUC and the ELN.  In an interview with 
BBC News, he noted that “We can no longer have a country [threatened] by 
guerrillas or defended by paramilitary groups.  We need central control.”110  This 
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central control would come via a new security strategy that emphasized a greater 
military role.  Decisive military action, he hoped, would defeat the enemy and 
force them to address options for conflict resolution and subsequent peace.   
This chapter will assess the effectiveness of the riverine operations that 
were part of Uribe’s new security strategy.  The first section presents the 
strategic visions laid out in the Naval Strategic Plan and the subsequent Naval 
Strategy against Narcoterrorism.  These two strategies formed the basis from 
which riverine forces launched their tactical fight to retake the rivers of Colombia. 
The second section provides a brief description of the riverine environment of 
Colombia which, by all accounts, is quite diverse.  The country can be divided 
into three distinct regions: the Pacific Coast, Caribbean Coast, and Eastern and 
Southern plains.  Each region is distinct from the other in every manner from its 
climate, foliage, and rainfall to the varied types of riverine systems and harbors it 
contains. This section will provide a sense of the magnitude of the problem 
posed by nature in Colombia, as well as suggest that the lessons learned from 
the diverse Colombian experience might be applicable in a wide range of riverine 
environments.   
The third section, entitled “Retaking the Rivers”, describes the capabilities, 
tactics and methodology of the riverine forces that have allowed them to regain 
control of the national waterways.  Although this success has been 
overshadowed by the constancy of the overall war on drugs, Colombian riverine 
forces have been able, in the short span of five years since 2002, to regain 
control and project state presence to nearly 70 percent of the navigable waters of 
the country.111  Their operations constitute, on average, 5 to 10 percent of the 
                                            
111 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentación CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, June 2007): 
16.  Based on total length of navigable rivers given as 12,660km and claim of control of 8,685km. 
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overall operations against drug trafficking.112  More directly, their control and 
security over the primary riverways has forced narco-terrorist organizations to 
relegate their activities to the secondary and tertiary riverways.  These results 
have been, in great part, the principal contributors to the noticeable shift in 
operations and drug routes toward the southern regions of Colombia.   
Colombia’s great success on the rivers can be attributed largely to 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Line of Communication (LOC) operations, two of 
their riverine core capabilities.  U.S. riverine capabilities in COIN and LOC were 
judged by CNA to be “limited” and “negligible”, respectively.  Colombia, in this 
case, stands to offers a template from which to study type and force size 
requirements, and tactical lessons of controlling natural and human nodes of 
flow.  
A. NAVAL STRATEGY 
On July 2003, the Colombian Armada published its Strategic Naval Plan 
(Plan Estratégico Naval).  This plan took into consideration the diverse threats 
currently facing Colombia and the most probable scenarios the Armada might 
find itself engaged in the future.  This document was a tool used to align the 
Armada’s strategic goals to the Colombian national interests set by the new 
president.  Its timeline was ambitious.  As noted in its Vision Statement, “By the 
year 2010 the National Armada through decisive and forceful operations will have 
contributed to the recovery and consolidation of peace and Colombian 
democratic security.”113  Securing the maritime and riverine systems within 
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Colombia will contribute directly to peace by weakening the threat from armed 
actors.  It would also contribute indirectly by enabling greater economic growth 
which would, in turn, “help reduce the levels of poverty, strengthen democratic 
stability, reduce the intensity of the terrorist threat, and reduce the crime and 
violence index”114 within the country.   
The Strategic Naval Plan went further and identified the following threats: 
• Terrorism 
• Trafficking of Illicit Drug  
• Illicit Finances 
• Trafficking of Arms, Munitions, and Explosives  
• Kidnapping and Extortion  
• Homicide 
All these elements were categorized as threats to Colombian National 
Security and are carried out by Narco-Terrorist Organizations (Organización 
Narco-Terrorista or ONT) such as the FARC, ELN and AUC.115  As a result, the 
Colombian Armada developed a specific naval strategy to combat narco-
terrorism called Closing the Gap (Cerrando Espacios).  This strategy was 
recently revised in June 2007 and is “aimed at denying narco-terrorism the use of 
the maritime, riverine, and land areas, under Colombian Navy responsibility.”116   
Colombia’s rivers, in total, extend a length of 15,774 kilometers.  Of these, 
12,660 kilometers, or approximately 80 percent, are considered navigable.117  
The Narco-Terrorist Organizations (ONT) have exploited these routes to nourish 
their actions by producing and trafficking narcotics as well as smuggling other 
necessary goods like precursor chemicals, arms, munitions, explosives, and 
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gasoline.  A study on the FARC and its financial expenditures and revenue was 
conducted by the Joint Intelligence Board (Junta de Inteligencia Conjunta) in 
2005.  This study found that the FARC’s main expenditure, nearly 39 percent of 
their total budget, was spent in the acquisition of precursor chemicals.118  Their 
number one form of revenue, on the other had, is in the production and 
commercialization of coca derivatives.  The production of cocaine has the ability 
to generate great revenue along every stage of production.  As such, the FARC 
has allocated approximately 5,000 men to the illicit cultivation of coca and has 
been able to exploit 70 percent of the total crops grown in its area of influence.  
In return, the sale revenues from this activity represent a 46 percent of the total 
income of the FARC.119 
The rivers in the Eastern and Southern plains, most notably the 
Putumayo, Inírida, Orinoco, and Caquetá, have become the main venues used to 
smuggle precursor chemicals into Colombia.  The rivers also play an important 
role in the production and distribution of the narcotic.  A large part of the paste 
production laboratories, crystallizing stations, collection and distribution bases, 
just to name a few, are all positioned along or near the river banks.  The naval 
strategy is aimed at reducing the narco-terrorist use of “these [venues] for the 
transportation of supplies and products from the cultivation areas and production 
centers in the interior of the country, to the collection, storage, and delivery points 
in the Colombian coasts.”120  This is a strategy of attrition reminiscent to the one 
fought by Lieutenant McLaughlin in the Second Seminole Indian War.  As the 
Colombian riverine gains control over the rivers of the country, it will slowly starve 
organizations like the FARC and ELN of vital resources necessary for their 
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existence.121 Consequently, the Navy’s strategic plan mandated the 
strengthening of the riverine program and called for its engagement along three 
operational environments: the Pacific Coast, the Caribbean Coast, and the 
Eastern and Southern Plains.   
B. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Colombia is host to an extremely diverse climate, geography, and 
environment.  The country itself has two coasts that access both the Caribbean 
Sea and the Pacific Ocean.  Down the center of Colombia run the Andes 
Mountains, considered the highest coastal mountains in the world, divides the 
country from north to south.  The majority of Colombians (95 percent) reside 
along the Caribbean coast and the central valleys of the Andes.  Of this large 
majority of the population, 70 percent live in just 10 cities.  The remaining 5 
percent of the total population live along sparse towns in the Amazon region.122 
As a landmass, Colombia encompasses 1,141,748 square kilometers 
(440,831 square miles);123 making it roughly one-and-a-half times the size of 
Texas (266,807 square miles).124  In terms of waterways, Colombia has “the 
world’s fourth-largest water reserves, with 4,500 micro-basins, 1,200 rivers, 
1,600 lakes, 1,900 marshes and two oceans.”125  Confronted with this diverse 
riverine environment, the Colombian Riverine Forces defined their areas of 
operation simply into two types.  One type is the Riverine Area and the other is 
the Riverine Basin.  The Riverine Area is defined as the internal area, to include 
the intersection of ocean and riverine waters, and consists of the internal riverine 
                                            
121 LTC Mike Brown, Army Section Chief, U.S. Military Group Colombia. Interview by author, 
Monterey, California (February 22, 2007). 
122 From Colombian Government Trade Bareau "About Colombia," Colombia Trade News 
(Washington, DC). http://www.coltrade.org/about/index.asp (accessed October 16, 2007). 
123 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentación CODENAL 2007,” 14. 
124 “Texas: Location, size, and extent,” City-data.com, http://www.city-
data.com/states/Texas-Location-size-and-extent.html. (accessed September 21, 2007)  
125 From Colombian Government Trade Bareau "Colombian Exports by Region 2001-2005," 
Colombia Trade News (Washington, DC) http://www.coltrade.org/tradedata/worldstats.asp 
(accessed October 16, 2007). 
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waterways that provide natural routes of transportation and communication.  This 
area can include “rivers, islands, river deltas, coasts adjacent to rivers, land 
areas close to rivers, lakes, lagoons, swamps, and canals.”  The River Basin is 
comprised of the principal rivers and the tributaries and includes the land area 
that interacts with the river system.126  These river basins and river areas are 
present, to varying degrees, in all three sections of the country.  Figure 16 below 
is a satellite picture of one of those sections.  The northern part of Colombia is 
considered arid by comparison to other areas of the country.  Yet, every filament 
depicted in this picture is considered part of, if not the whole, of a principal 
waterway or river.  This picture helps put into perspective the vastness of the 
bodies of water that exist in Colombia.  If one adds to these the land area that 
interacts with the river system, as included in the definition of a river basin, the 
operational area charged to the riverine forces begins to encompass a large 
percentage of the overall landmass of the country.   
                                            
126 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 15. 
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Figure 16.   Satellite Photo of Northern Rivers Colombia 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Importancia de la I.M. en el Desarrollo del 
Poder Naval,” (Colombia, May 2004): 52 
The climate and environment of the Caribbean coast is one of the most 
arid in Colombia.  Figure 17 shows the level of aridity of the area.  Figure 19 
depicts the average annual rainfall of 1000 millimeters (39 inches) of the region 
as well.  As a result, dense vegetation is not a major obstacle like in other 
regions, but the area’s extensive beaches provide multiple launching points for 
drug traffickers.  The Caribbean coast offers other advantages to organizations 
like the FARC, ELN, and AUC.  First, it is in close proximity to commercial trade 
routes traveling to and from the Panama Canal.  Secondly, it is geographically 
close to other Caribbean islands and several Central American countries, making 
travel distances short.  The natural make-up of this region in addition to its close 
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“geographical proximity to consumer markets”127 provides an excellent logistical 
launching point and advantage.  It is no surprise, then, that drug trafficking is the 
ONTs’ most lucrative activity in the Caribbean coast.  This allows organizations 
like the FARC, ELN, and AUC to use a myriad of methods such as “fast boats, 
coastal fishing boats, merchant ships and submersibles” 128 to conduct 
successful operations.  The riverine operations, concentrated along the main 
rivers in the area -- Magdalena, Cauca, and Atrato -- have been essential to the 
Armada’s success in the region.  Overall, Colombian riverine forces are in charge 
of providing control and security to a total of 2,219 kilometers (1,379 miles) of 
primary riverways in this area.129     
The Eastern and Southern plains are often referred to as one 
geographical region.130  These portions of the country are covered by the 
Amazon’s dense, triple canopy tropical rain forests.  Even though this area 
contains nearly 58 percent of the country’s territory, only 5 percent of the 
country's population resides there.131  This vast and under-populated land is 
extremely difficult to access.  Historically, this led to very little State presence and 
infrastructure development such as “public institutions, roads, schools and 
utilities.”132  As such, the rivers became principle routes of access and 
transportation.  Most of the population, hence, can be found settled “on or near 
the riverbanks.”133  
 
 
                                            
127 Armada República de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, vi. 
128 Armada República de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro,19. 
129 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentación CODENAL 2007,” 56, 58. 
130 This is most common when referring to the region in terms of military operations.  The 
distinction originated due to the natural boundary formed by the Andes Mountains that crosses 
Colombia almost from North to South.   
131 From Colombian Government Trade Bareau "About Colombia," Colombia Trade News 
(Washington, DC). http://www.coltrade.org/about/index.asp (accessed October 16, 2007). 
132 Ibid. 
 70
Figure 17.   Water Levels Colombia 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Importancia de la I.M. en el Desarrollo del 
Poder Naval,” (Colombia, May 2004): 56 
In terms of climate and fluvial environment, however, the Eastern and 
Southern regions are a little different.  The Eastern plains consist of three major 
rivers, the Orinoco, Meta and Arauca.  From November through March, sections 
of the riverways in this region dry up making them impassable with waterborne 
crafts.  Nonetheless, these riverways supply the area with average levels of 
water (see green shaded areas on Figure 17) that provide sufficient irrigation for 
the land making it highly fertile.  The Southern region, shaded in purple, contains 
on average an excessive amount of water.  This makes the rivers there highly 
fluvial and more conducive to riverine operations.   
 
                                            
133 Willey. 28. 
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Figure 18.   Flood Zones in Colombia 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Importancia de la I.M. en el Desarrollo del 
Poder Naval,” (Colombia, May 2004): 57 
The variant that affects both regions tremendously are their seasonal 
rainfalls.  The Eastern and Southern regions receive nearly 2500 millimeters (98 
inches) to 4000 millimeters (157 inches) of rain respectively (see Figure 19).  
This excess water makes each region highly susceptible to seasonal flooding 
(see Figure 18). As a consequence, riverine operations, especially in the 
Southern part of Colombia, become constrained.  Though excessive flooding 
does permit greater riverine access, it also hinders other aspects of riverine 
operations.  The river’s safe navigable routes, for example, shifts when it floods.  
This makes river markings futile and results in a greater need for local 
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intelligence in the form of river pilots.  Further, land operations134 are also 
affected by making this environment even more hostile and difficult to traverse.  
Finally, flooded waterways become more useful to ONTs since they make 
secondary waterways more accessible and often even create tertiary rivers which 
are inaccessible to Colombian forces.   
Figure 19.   Average Rainfall Colombia 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Importancia de la I.M. en el Desarrollo del 
Poder Naval,” (Colombia, May 2004): 53 
The Eastern and Southern regions are also unique because the majority 
of the rivers in this area form a big part of Colombia’s national and natural 
boundaries (see Figure 20).  This makes riverine operations there not only 
important in the fight against narco-terrorism, but also crucial for safeguarding 
                                            
134 Land operations are integral to the development of riverine operations by safeguarding 
the area further inland of the riverways. 
 73
the sovereignty of Colombia.  The 1800 kilometer riverine frontier, however, 
places an increased requirement for forces directly involved with border security; 
this reduces the availability of units for conducting operations against 
subversives.  
Figure 20.   Colombian Natural Riverine Borders 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 21 
The side of Colombia facing the Pacific has two distinct features.  The 
Northern portion of the Pacific coastline is “characterized by rocky cliffs…bays 
and inlets.”135  As one moves further south, the terrain becomes wide and is 
overtaken by tidal floodplains that are considered one of the wettest regions in 
the world.  The average rainfall here ranges from 197 inches to over 490 inches 
of rain yearly (see Figure 19).  By comparison, average rainfall in Yakutat, 
Arkansas, which recorded the heaviest annual rainfall in the U.S. from 1961 to 
                                            
135 Armada República de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, iv. 
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1990, is only 151 inches per annum.136  These flooded plains and constant rain 
form a “labyrinth network of streams, channels and estuaries.”137  This region is 
also covered by a heavy triple canopy of tropical rain forests that combined with 
its heavy rains creates dense vegetation and mangroves.  These conditions have 
made it extremely difficult to build and maintain paved roads across this section 
of land.  As a result, this southern area is not heavily populated making it an 
excellent location that enables ONTs to amass large quantities of drugs.  The 
principal mode for transporting drugs, from a seemingly endless number of 
waterways with access to the Pacific, is via four engine fast boats. 
Narco-terrorist groups have positioned themselves along each zone for 
different reasons.  They have chosen the Caribbean coast for its easily 
accessible coast and high volume of commerce that allows them to use a variety 
of methods to amass and distribute their product to international markets.  The 
Eastern plains and the region south of the mountains offer two advantages.  The 
region is replete with various rivers and estuaries.  The seasonal dry spells make 
it difficult for government riverine forces to operate.  The heavy rains and 
flooding, on the other hand, help by creating tertiary rivers that are inaccessible 
to conventional forces but exploitable by ONTs.  The natural border formed by 
these many rivers creates an ideal environment for smuggling products like 
gasoline, food, clothes, guns, and precursor chemicals virtually undetected.  
Likewise, the natural make-up of the Pacific coast has been exploited.  The lack 
of road infrastructure, the excessive amount of streams and channels, combined 
with the rainfall that feeds it, make this area extremely difficult to control or 
secure.  
                                            
136 Department of Meteorology. “Normal Monthly Precipitation, Inches,” University of Utah, 
(Utah). http://www.met.utah.edu/jhorel/html/wx/climate/normrain.html. (accessed November 10, 
2007).   
137 Armada República de Colombia. Cerrando Espacios: Rumbo al Futuro, iv. 
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C. RETAKING THE RIVERS 
The development of a new and more aggressive strategy toward Narco-
Terrorist Organizations helped the Colombian Riverine Forces develop three 
core capabilities to provide river security and control.  Colombia’s limited 
resources, however, placed constraints that made it necessary to reassess and 
engage the problem through a useful and efficient set of tactics.  As a result, the 
riverine force opted to rely on intelligence gathering and natural observation of 
the environment.  Soon after they determined the various natural river nodes and 
the enemy’s LOC choke points and used them to systematically attack the ONTs 
along the rivers.  The Riverine Support Patrol Boat or PAF became their key 
asset in this endeavor due to its survivability, firepower, simplicity and 
adaptability in the combat environment.  The PAF vessels can provide refueling 
for other units, extending their operational time on station, and are capable of 
providing sustenance, bedding, and troop transport.  Their initial success along 
the primary rivers caused a shift of ONT operations toward more restricted 
waterways.  The Colombian riverine force responded quickly with the creation of 
light riverine vessels to engage the enemy in this new environment.  The 
following sections will discuss these innovations and tactics that allowed for the 
current Colombian success.  
1. Strategic Placement of Riverine Forces 
Since 2002, the Colombian Riverine Forces have engaged the enemy with 
varying degrees of intensity in every region of the country.138  The Caribbean 
coast, usually the source of the most export routes, was the early epicenter of the 
fight against drugs.  The First Marine Infantry Brigade was located in this region; 
the primary goal would be to retake control of the River Magdalena followed by 
the other rivers and tributaries in the area.  Figure 21 shows the overall FARC 
                                            
138 No data will be presented for the location of the AUC fronts.  During the interviews and 
briefs provided during my visit to Colombia in September, 2007, information concerning AUC 
fronts or strategic riverine placement to combat them was not provided.  Therefore, this section 
will only focus on the strategic placement of riverine forces against the FARC and ELN. 
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fronts and the corresponding riverine battalions established in the area.  This 
figure was an assessment taken as of June 2007 and places most FARC activity 
along the Caribbean coast and the Southern plains of Colombia. The North 
Pacific coast was the target in the second stage of the government offensive.  
Operations along the River Atrato were launched from the base located in the 
bay of Turbo.   
Figure 21.   ONT FARC Fronts and Riverine Battalions 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 25 
The ELN has the majority of its fronts and personnel located along the 
Maria Mountains (Montes de Maria) with some positioned in the Caribbean coast 
(see Figure 22).  Consequently, BAFLIMs 20 and 30 have been positioned on the 
Caribbean coast and along the mountain range.  Of the two, however, BAFLIM 
30 provides the mainstay of the Colombian riverine force engaged against the 
ELN. 
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Both Figures 21 and 22 show little presence along the southern Pacific 
coast.  This fact, however, is changing.  Success along the Caribbean and North 
Pacific regions has caused a shift in the type of activities and focus of the ONTs.  
With these two areas secure, the front of the fight has now shifted to the Eastern 
and Southern plains and the South Pacific regions.  Consequently, both BAFLIM 
70 and 80 were recently created to bring greater support to BAFLIM 10 in the 
Southern Pacific area.   
Figure 22.   ONT ELN Fronts and Riverine Battalions 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 26 
In addition, Colombian forces are aggressively monitoring the activity of 
Criminal Bands (Banda Criminal or BACRIM), which are nothing more than 
armed gangs.  Criminal band activity has been increasing.  They are employed 
by ONTs to serve as strong-arm groups and as a low level conduit for other illicit 
activities.  It is not surprising, then, that they are located along the seams of each 
region of the country.  Figure 23 shows that their presence provides a physical 
link between the Caribbean, Pacific, and Eastern regions.  Though the behavior 
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of the BACRIM is a cause for concern, their levels of criminal activity is below 
that of the ELN or FARC.  As such, the riverine forces have not specifically 
shifted the location of any BAFLIM to contend with this issue.    
Figure 23.   BACRIM Location 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 27 
2. Riverine Capabilities 
The Colombian Riverine Force, as part of the naval strategy, has identified 
three types of riverine operations: Riverine Assault; Riverine Surveillance, 
Interdiction and Security; and Riverine Support.139  Colombian core capabilities 
of River Control and River Security are embedded in the definition and execution 
of both Riverine Assault and Riverine Surveillance, Interdiction and Security 
                                            
139 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 74. 
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(SIS) operations.  The sub tasks and sub functions contained within these two 
categories are analogous to the CNA definitions of COIN and LOC operations as 
they relate to river control and security.  
Riverine Assault is defined as quick strikes launched against enemy 
riverine units and land units along the river shores.  There are two types of 
assault: ambush and quick strike.  These functions are in parallel with the CNA 
requirements and subtasks for Offensive operations in both area security and 
river control (see Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 2).  The objective of assault 
operations is to locate and neutralize the enemy and its installations near the 
riverbanks.  The main force type used is a Riverine Combat Group (Grupo 
Combate Fluvial GCF) with an attached Riverine Assault Group (Grupo de Asalto 
Fluvial GAF).  Either the Riverine Combat Elements (Elemento de Combate 
Fluvial ECF) or the GAF acts as the primary force depending on whether the 
operation is a quick strike or an ambush.  The GCF, with a PAF as the C3 unit, 
provides supporting fires, coordinates air support if available, and presents a 
protective blockade against enemy ambush.  Properly employed, these forces 
can establish control and security of the lines of communication (LOC) provide 
the necessary freedom of navigation, and aid in the control of land, population 
and resources adjacent to the rivers.140 
Riverine Surveillance, Interdiction and Security (SIS) are defensive 
operations executed to control the navigable rivers with the intent of providing 
security and freedom of navigation, protecting lines of communication, and 
preventing riverine use by the enemy.  These operations should also obtain 
intelligence and maintain control, like Assault operations, of the population and 
its resources. There are five types of SIS operations: Riverine Control; Riverine 
Blockade; Listening and Observation; Escort; and Visit and Inspection of ships.   
A GCF or a capable single vessel such as the Fast Riverine Patrol Boats 
is the preferred units to exert riverine control.  These units can be used to form 
                                            
140 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 75-88. 
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chokepoints or block access to certain vessels.  Four objectives can be attained 
with these operations.  One is to control the overall flow of people, ships, and 
material.  The second is to control the flow of goods to a determined area.  Third 
is to control and direct shipping traffic, and finally, it can be used to segregate a 
specified area in order to conduct other operations.  These objectives are 
comparable to the ones sought by the U.S. Riverine forces.  Once again, the 
functions performed under this capability are equivalent to the CNA requirements 
and subtasks for riverine Defensive Operations for river security and control.141   
Riverine Support Operations are typically conducted in support of other 
forces.  The overall goal is to control and neutralize of the enemy along a riverine 
area or its adjacent land.  These types of operations can be accomplished by a 
GCF alone or, in the case of special operations, with the addition of a Riverine 
Combat Element.  There are four types of Riverine Support Operations: 
Diversionary; Land and/or Air Support; Joint Action; and Troop Transport.   
Diversionary operations are conducted by riverine forces to distract or 
deceive the enemy to allow the main force the opportunity to deliver a decisive 
strike upon the enemy.  Land and/ or Air Support operations take advantage of 
the mobility and transport capabilities of the riverine units like the PAF to insert or 
extract troops into or from enemy territory.  These operations can also be 
combined with riverine Assault and SIS operations.  One tactical requirement 
mandates that the riverine force be capable of conducting these operations in 
one or more waterways to help isolate the area from enemy logistical and force 
support.  Joint Action operations focus on riverine force contributions to gain the 
faith and trust of the civilian population.  One of the main goals is to reinforce the 
institutional image and presence of the State.  Finally, Troop Transport 
operations are provided in direct support of land military operations.  Riverine 
TTPs dictate that units from the ECF, akin to those currently in the U.S. riverine 
squadron, should not be used in these operations.  Their vulnerability to enemy 
                                            
141 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 89-109. 
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fire coupled with the loss of maneuverability, due to the extra weight, precludes 
their safe execution of these operations.  As a result, the PAFP or PAFL are the 
main vessels utilized toward this end due to its survivability in the riverine 
environment, its capability to transport up to 32 combat ready infantrymen, its 
capacity to provide protection to less protected transport vessels, and its ability to 
provide direct fire support.   
Unlike Riverine Assault and SIS operations, Colombian Riverine Support 
cannot be directly related to a defined CNA operational task.  As it stands 
however, the U.S. riverine force would be hard pressed to execute these types of 
operations.  With one U.S. riverine squadron active at any one time, the 
availability of only 12 vessels limits the execution of multiple operations toward 
river control or security.  Adding riverine support would further strain these 
resources, making it difficult to allocate the necessary units for effective 
operations along two or more waterways.  Further, the absence of a vessel 
similar to the PAFP or PAFL would make it difficult to provide the land 
component with the necessary forces or direct fire support from the rivers.    
3. Riverine Support Patrol Vessel (Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial 
PAF) 
This vessel, when placed at the head of a Riverine Combat Group (Grupo 
de Combate Fluvial GCF), harks back to the time of the Vietnam War.  There, 
General Westmoreland’s Mobile Riverine Force was effective in exploiting the 
capabilities of troop transport, self-containment, survivability and firepower to 
bring success to the riverine environment.  In a similar fashion, the Colombian 
GCF through the capabilities of the PAF is able to provide overwhelming direct 
fire support during offensive and defensive riverine and joint land operations.  
The unit’s capacity to safely transport troops and protect other transport vessels 
make it indispensable in the control and neutralization of the rivers and its 
adjacent land areas.  Furthermore, the PAF operational range of approximately 
4,000 kilometers allows it to traverse the length of almost any Colombian river 
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and engage in operations.142  This capability has enabled the GCF to extend 
operations without the need of forward operating bases. 
By all measures, the Riverine Support Patrol Vessel or PAF is one of 
Colombia’s riverine success stories.  This vessel, commonly known as the 
Nodriza, is now in its fourth generation of development.  Its general dimensions 
include:143 
• Length Overall  40.30 meters 
• Beam    9.5 meters 
• Depth    3.10 meters 
• Displacement  373.0 tons (approximately) 
• Top Speed    9.0 knots in deep and inner waters 
Tank Capacity 
• Diesel Fuel   8602 gallons 
• Aviation Fuel   2000 gallons 
• Fresh Water   5890 gallons 
• Gasoline   5580 gallons  
The PAFs are well protected ships possessing a Level III special armoring 
that is in accordance with the U.S. National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 0108.01 
regulations.144  Level III special armor is the second highest level of protection 
available.  As defined by the NIJ, Level III armor can sustain a direct shot from 50 
meters by “a 7.62 mm full metal jacketed (U.S. military designation M80) test 
bullet traveling at a measured velocities of 838 ± 15 m (2850 ± 50 ft) per 
                                            
142 CF Jaime Hernando Jiménez, Commercial Department Manager-COTECMAR.  Brief 
attended by author, (Colombia, September 17, 2007).   
143 “Technical Specifications: Riverine Support Patrol Vessel PAF III,” Corporación de 
Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industria Naval, Marítima y Fluvial COTECMAR, 
(Colombia, 2007): 3. 
144 “Technical Specifications: Riverine Support Patrol Vessel PAF III,” 5.    
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second.”145  This armor covers every exposed area of the ship and extends 20 
centimeters (approximately 8 inches) below the water level.  In 2004 a PAF type 
vessel was hit by a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG).  A 1 foot diameter hole 
was created on the outer hull and a 2 inch diameter hole was punctured in the 
inner hull.  The ship maintained water integrity.  There were no casualties as a 
result of this attack and only simple “hole cut” repairs were needed to mend the 
ship.146     
The PAF is also designed to withstand and survive natural hazards.  The 
engines and propulsion systems are highly adept to the riverine environment.  
The two German manufactured engines provide 450 BHP (Brake Horse Power) 
each at 1800 revolutions per minute (RPM).  The use of Schottel type SPJ-82RD 
pump jets, which can inhale up to 2 inch rocks without damage, precludes the 
need for propellers.  Propellers are a common source of catastrophic failure or 
damage due to the rocks and other natural obstacles present in rivers.147  These 
pump jets have a 360 degree freedom of rotation and are designed never to 
cavitate.  This allows the ship to be extremely maneuverable and exceptionally 
silent if trying to avoid detection.  Of note, the ship can rotate on its axis at 27.5 
degrees per second and only requires 1.5 boat lengths from full forward to full 
stop, making it extremely maneuverable in restricted spaces. 
The PAF survivability is a key factor that helps the riverine force attain and 
maintain control of the rivers.  For example, if the Riverine Combat Group is 
ambushed, the TTP dictates that the ECF units escape the “kill zone” and 
regroup.  Meanwhile, the PAF will retaliate with all available assets to suppress 
the enemy fire.  The PAF will fully employ its overwhelming firepower to regain 
the advantage.  In almost every encounter against ONT elements, the PAF has 
                                            
145 National Institute of Justice. “Technology Assessment Program: Ballistic Resistant 
Protective Materials NIJ Standard 0108.01,” U.S. Department of Justice, (September 1985): 7. 
http://www.eeel.nist.gov/oles/Publications/NIJ-0108.01.pdf (accessed November 11, 2007).  
146 CF Jaime Hernando Jiménez, Commercial Department Manager-COTECMAR.  Brief 
attended by author, (Colombia, September 17, 2007). 
147 “Technical Specifications: Riverine Support Patrol Vessel PAF III,” 5. 
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been able to achieve the advantage to pin-down or disperse its enemy.  As a 
result, this has allowed the ECF units to mount a counter-attack.  This TTP 
shows just how essential a unit like the PAF is in maintaining control of the 
riverways. 
The ship is also highly adaptable.  It is designed to serve as a mobile 
supply platform for mid-sized helicopters, host and transport troops, provide fuel 
for other units, and provide control and maintain communications with air, land 
and sea assets.  The PAF are capable of landing helicopters similar to the Bell 
412 or UH-1H.  The flight deck has a Level III classification that allows for 
daylight operations during Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).148  The 
aviation fuel tank onboard has a fuel capacity of 2000 gallons.  The Bell 412 
aircraft has a fuel capacity of 330 gallons for an average 414 nautical mile 
range.149  The UH-1H helicopter can hold 211 gallons and has a range of 253 
nautical miles.  Endurance on these aircraft are 3.5 and 2.8 hours (with no 
reserve fuel gallons), respectively.150  With 2000 gallons onboard, the PAF could 
refuel a helicopter over six times if needed.  This extends the range and 
operating time allowing for greater surveillance, direct air support, or medical 
evacuations.  A gasoline dispensing system is also included to provide fuel 
supply to the boats of an ECF.  These gas-station type pumps are located on the 
bow of the ship, on the starboard and port sides.  Each pump is capable of 
simultaneously supplying 12 gallons per minute of gasoline and can refuel two 
boats approximately every 20 minutes.151  Since the average fuel capacity of a 
boat of an ECF is 220 gallons, the PAF is able to refuel the whole ECF – a total 
of eight boats -- six times.  Each refueling allows an ECF boat to remain on 
station for an average of 7 hours; thus, the PAF allows for the operational range 
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of the ECF to extend to nearly 47 hours.  This ability to extend the range of 
operations helped push efforts against ONT elements further upriver without the 
need for a permanent base of operations.  
There are three cabins onboard that can house up to 27 crewmen.  
Functionally, the vessel only requires a 16 person crew to operate.  The 
manpower required on the bridge is also minimal.152  As a transport, it has three 
more cabins with the capacity to house 32 fully geared infantry men.153  There is 
also a galley that can provide sustenance for up to 15 days and an infirmary to 
treat the wounded.  
The ship has an extremely capable communications suite.  It includes HF, 
VHF, and UHF tactical and base radios as well as satellite and mobile microwave 
phones.154  With this equipment the PAF can perform as a command and control 
unit that is capable of maintaining simultaneous communications with 
waterborne, land-based and airborne tactical units, making it an excellent C3 
platform that can be fully integrated in the joint environment.   
Finally, the PAF is an extremely uncomplicated design.  The ship is 
constructed mainly using off-the-shelf systems: from the engines to the targeting 
system for its MK19 grenade launcher.  The total time required to build one of 
these units has been reduced from 18 months to 13 months.  Everything on the 
ship can be replaced rapidly and, most importantly, with little cost.  The design of 
the ship allows for mechanics to have full access to both engine compartments 
and perform all level maintenance on the system without the need of a dry dock.  
Access to weapon stations and ammunition is all internal.  
The capabilities that are provided by the Riverine Support Patrol Boats are 
indispensable.  Beyond its flexibility to accommodate ground units and supply 
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153 “Technical Specifications: Riverine Support Patrol Vessel PAF III,” 8. 
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fuel to aerial and waterborne craft, the greatest asset of the PAF is its ability to 
survive in combat.  As noted by Capitan de Fragata Jaime Jimenez, COTECMAR 
lead project designer, the PAF is armored and well supplied; it was not designed 
to escape, it was designed to fight.155  It is this kind of vessel that is needed to 
exert control and provide security in the riverine environment.  Without it, 
elements like the RCE or a U.S. riverine detachment will succumb in combat due 
to their lack of protection and inability to project fires ashore.     
4. Into the Rivers 
The Colombian Riverine Forces recognized early on that it did not 
possess the sufficient number of vessels nor the resources to continuously 
provide control or security of its vast riverine system.  As a consequence, they 
devised efficient and useful tactics to combat their enemies.   
As noted previously, the Riverine Combat Group, with a PAF in command 
and its two embedded ECFs, is Colombia’s fundamental unit in the execution of 
Colombia’s River Control and Security capabilities. Key to the success of these 
units was their work during the planning phases, when they studied the riverine 
waterways to determine the most frequent transit lanes and evacuation routes 
used by the enemy.  The TTP titled Listening and Observation (Observación y 
Escucha) provides a specific methodology for conducting these operations to 
attain the proper and necessary intelligence.156  In addition, they analyzed the 
river characteristics not only to determine its natural conditions, but to ascertain 
its naturally formed choke points.  In essence, they determined, via intelligence 
and physical study, both the enemy LOCs and natural nodes present in every 
river.  Armed with this knowledge, the riverine forces employed their Riverine 
Combat Groups to target both the natural and enemy LOC choke points. 
                                            
155 CF Jaime Hernando Jiménez, Commercial Department Manager-COTECMAR.  Brief 
attended by author, (Colombia, September 17, 2007). 
156 Armada Nacional de Colombia. Operaciones Fluviales, 97. 
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Initial operations into a river typically originate from an established military 
base or Riverine Advanced Post (Puesto Fluvial Avanzado PFA).  From this 
starting point the GCF proceeds toward the strategic nodes along the river to 
begin combat operations and exercise control.  The process is slow and difficult.  
The PAFs overwhelming firepower and heavily armored superstructure make it 
the preferred unit for initial engagement and combat with enemy forces.  
Operational combat can extend from a couple of hours to several days.  As the 
enemy is ultimately suppressed, the PAFs role as a Command and Control 
station directs the ECFs to execute patrol, interdiction, and intelligence and 
blockade operations.  As control and security are gained and maintained, the 
GCF proceeds toward the next riverine choke point.  Continuous operations 
cannot be maintained for extended periods of time as it creates a strain in the 
logistical support required to maintain these units operational.  To mitigate this, a 
forward operating post is created.  This can come in the form of a Riverine 
Advanced Post or a Riverine Support Station (Estacíon Móvil de Apoyo Fluvial 
EMAF).  An advanced post will be created if the location is strategically important 
and the resources and access exists to enable its construction.  If these 
requirements are not met, and the location can be provided with enough security, 
an EMAF will be transported via the river and be employed instead.  On either 
case, this new base will form the logistical base and new launching point for 
future operations.    
These tactics have made the riverine forces successful along the primary 
rivers.  The ONTs have relegated much of their activities to more restricted 
waterways where conventional forces could not easily reach.  In response, the 
Colombian riverine formed the Light Riverine Combat Element (Elemento de 
Combate Fluvial Liviano ECFL).  This was reminiscent of the 1950 “Flotilla 
Avispa,” since the mainstay of this force, once again, sought to use small shallow 
draft aluminum boats.  Additionally, it developed the Light Riverine Support Patrol 
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Boat,157 capable of entering the shallower secondary rivers.  With these two 
assets, Colombia’s riverine force engaged the enemy along the secondary and 
tertiary waterways.  Tactically, the Light Riverine Support Patrol Boat’s inability to 
provide the ECFL with protection along the tertiary waterways has resulted on an 
increased need for intelligence gathering via its Listening and Observation TTP 
to provide a greater margin of safety for the attacking force.  Also, the ECFLs 
have shifted their focus primarily on the tactical execution of Riverine Assault 
operations specifically the “quick strike” variety.   
Since 2002 the Colombian Riverine Forces have developed sound and 
efficient tactical procedures to combat their enemies.  These tactics have been 
methodically applied along the primary riverways and their tributaries to great 
effect.  The following section discusses the level of success along some of the 
different regions of Colombia. 
5. Overall Results  
The Colombian riverine forces define success differently in this 
environment.  They seldom use a set length to define the control of an area.  
Instead, when the GCF enters a zone its control is determined when routine 
patrols can be safely established.  In other words, the lack of direct engagement 
by the enemy is used as a success indicator.  This tactic has proven to be 
correct.  Elements of the ONT, once defeated, rarely remain in an area or mount 
operations to try and regain territory.  This is in large part due to the extreme 
protection and overwhelming firepower brought by the GCF, mainly via its PAF.  
Interestingly, the riverine forces have discovered that with time the number of 
ONT force engaging a riverine group or GCF has steadily decreased.  Initially, 
elements like the FARC would engage directly with groups of 30 to 40 soldiers.  
This number soon dropped to bands of 10 to 15 soldiers thinly spread across the 
riverbanks, with activity most often reverting to a handful of sharpshooters.  
                                            
157 This smaller version of the generation IV PAF has similar capabilities but does not 
include a flight deck.  
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Figure 24 depicts the current standing of the Colombian riverine forces along the 
Atrato River.  Each red dot represents a step or node where the riverine GCF or 
its subordinate units attacked as they steadily and patiently inched their way 
down the river.158  The example provided here took place along one river, the 
Atrato, located in the North Pacific coast.   
Figure 24.   Tactical Deployment – Río Atrato (North Pacific) 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 56 
                                            
158 SV Esteban Celis, SV Jovanni Segovia Salcedo. ST Andres Salas Calle.  Interviewed by 
author, (Colombia, September 14, 2007). 
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According to a U.S. estimate in 2006, 48 percent of the 508 kilometers of 
river is currently controlled by the Colombian Riverine Forces.159  As of 2007, 
Colombian estimates have this figure nearing the 80 percent mark.  The real 
value lies probably somewhere between 65 and 70 percent.  That withstanding, 
even a conservative estimate of 65 percent control and security (equivalent to 
over 330 kilometers) of a river is still an impressive feat.  Figure 25 below 
provides a pictorial view of the Colombian achievements along the Atrato River in 
the Northern Pacific coast.  
Figure 25.   River Control and Security (North Pacific and Caribbean) 
 
Source: “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group (Bogotá, 
Colombia: January 2006) 
                                            
159 “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group (Bogotá, Colombia: 
January 2006). 
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The number of units currently expended to maintain the current level of 
control and security of the Atrato River are as follows:160 
• 2 Riverine Support Patrol Boat Heavy (Patrulleras de Apoyo Fluvial 
Pesado PAFP) 
• 4 Fast Riverine Patrol Boats (Patrulleras Rápidas Fluviales PRF) 
• 3 Armored Troop Carriers (Transportes Blindados de Tropa TBT) 
• 4 Riverine Combat Elements (Elemento de Combate Fluvial ECF) 
• 6 Riverine Assault Battalions (Batallon de Asalto Fluvial BAF)  
Some of the notable successes claimed by the Colombian Riverine Force 
include the reactivation of the economy in the region and the return of the 
Atrato’s freedom of navigation.  This effort is echoed by the marked improvement 
in the economy of the region due to the increased revenue from lumber 
transports and other local products.161  Furthermore, the riverine force has been 
able to take control over the territory and the security of the riverine population.  
This came at the heels of the disbandment of the FARC fronts 57 and 34 that 
operated within the region.162   
Colombian riverine operations have had marked success.  Figures 26 and 
27 below show the control achieved along the Eastern and Southern Plains.  As 
can be seen, the amount of Advanced Riverine Posts is much smaller than those 
found in the Caribbean or Northern Pacific regions.  For this reason, the success 
along both the Eastern and Southern plains has been of a lesser degree when 
compared to that experienced along the River Atrato.  Nonetheless, Riverine 
operations in these areas have been able to re-establish the safe navigation 
along the rivers.  They have also rekindled the local economy that is dependent 
on fishing and traditional commerce along the rivers for sustenance.  Notably, the 
                                            
160 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” 56. 
161 CF Luis Bernardo Ramirez. “Reactivación del Río Atrato,” Revista Armada No. 86, 
(Colombia, January 13, 2005). 
162 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” 57. 
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riverine force has been able to disband Front 16 of the FARC in the East and 
Fronts 48 and 49 in the South and free the river lines of communication of their 
control.163  
Figure 26.   River Control and Security (Eastern Plains) 
 
Source: “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group (Bogotá, 
Colombia: January 2006 
With the success of riverine operations along the principal rivers, ONT 
traffic began to move to secondary waterways.  When the Colombian Armada 
responded effectively to this by creating and deploying the Light Riverine Combat 
Element, the ONT pushed even further upriver and into the tertiary tributaries, 
commonly referred to as “caños fluviales.”  These riverways are usually 1.5 
meters deep (nearly 5 feet), extremely narrow and usually covered by the jungle 
overgrowth (see Figure 28).  The ONT regression into the constrained areas of 
the rivers has temporarily hindered the Colombian’s ability to combat the enemy.  
Relegation of the ONT into these areas, however, means that most of the 
principal and many of the secondary rivers are again open to free navigation and 
                                            
163 Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” 61, 63, 65. 
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legal commerce.  This, coupled with a growth of local and native fishing in 
addition to the increased of state presence, is a positive indicator of progress. 
Figure 27.   River Control and Security (Southern Pacific and Southern Plains) 
 
Source: “Information Brief for Mr. Brick Scoggins,” U.S. Military Group (Bogotá, 
Colombia: January 2006 
Finally, in part as a result of the operational successes along the rivers of 
Colombia, the observed traffic routes of illicit narcotics out of the country have 
shifted.  An independent study conducted by the United Nations determined that 
approximately 557 metric tons of coca would be produced during the course of 
this year.  In past years, the majority (nearly 70 percent) of the product obtained 
from these 557 metric tons reached international markets via the Caribbean.  As 
of 2007, it is estimated that the Caribbean routes will serve to export only 91 
metric tons, or 16.3 percent of the gross production.  Instead, areas such as the 
southern edge of the Pacific coast and the Eastern plains have seen a marked 
increase.  It is estimated that 194 metric tons, or 34.8 percent, will depart from 
the Pacific coast.  Nearly the same amount -- 195 metric tons, or 35.1 percent -- 
will depart via the Eastern plains through Venezuela and Brazil.  Almost all of this 
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product will reach its final exporting destination via the internal rivers of 
Colombia. 164  The notable shift in exportation routes is a significant indicator that 
the riverine efforts exerted in the Caribbean and North Pacific coasts have been 
successful.     
Figure 28.   ONT Vessel on Tertiary Rivers 
 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia. “Presentacion CODENAL 2007,” (Colombia, 
June 2007): 31 
D. CONCLUSION 
The elections of Alvaro Uribe in May of 2002 brought, as promised, a 
marked increase in the level of military activity against Narco-Terrorist 
Organizations.  The Colombian Naval Strategic Plan 2003-2010 and the 
subsequent Naval Strategy against Narcoterrorism were developed to address 
                                            
164 Figures and information obtained during a cursory briefing attended by author, 
(Colombia, September 13, 2007).  The figure of 557 metric tons was determined by estimating 
the number of hectares available for cultivation, the number of crops that can be produced, and 
the number of bundles that can be extracted from each hectare.  This estimate is within 5 percent 
of the figure estimated by the United States.  
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the ONT issue specifically.  Under these rubrics, the Colombian Riverine Forces 
developed three core capabilities akin to COIN and LOC protection for river 
security and control.  They used these capabilities to engage an elusive, 
determined and dangerous enemy along the three different regions of the 
country.   
This strategy was first applied methodically and patiently to the Caribbean 
and North Pacific coasts.  The constraints of fuel and combat range experienced 
by the Colombian units spawned a useful set of tactics.  They showed that it is 
not necessary to exercise 100 percent pressure in the rivers to be effective.  
Rather, through intelligence gathering and natural observation, the riverine forces 
can be effective if they systematically attack along the river’s natural nodes and 
the enemy’s LOC choke points.   
The constraints and changes in enemy tactics also fueled innovations in 
equipment (as well as the development of TTP to use the new equipment 
effectively).   First and most importantly, the riverine forces of Colombia showed 
that it is imperative to have a unit that combines survivability, firepower, simplicity 
and adaptability in the combat environment.  The PAF vessels accomplish all 
these tasks.  The vessel serves as a hub boat that can provide fuel to other units 
for prolonged periods of time.  It is also a mobile unit that can be down-river and 
provide sustenance, bedding, and a launch platform for joint operations.  In the 
end, the PAF is a unit that projects enough firepower and is safe enough to 
remain on scene, making it lethal and feared amongst its enemies.  Second, as 
the enemy is forced to change its tactics, the riverine force must also be flexible.  
The Colombian riverine forces quickly adapted to the changing tactics of the ONT 
and added light riverine vessels to help confront the enemy on the secondary 
and tertiary waterways.   
The riverine forces have been successful, procuring control over 
approximately 65 to 70 percent of rivers.  This is an astonishing accomplishment 
considering the length of rivers present in Colombia and the short timeline of five 
years, from 2002 to present.  Narco-Terrorist Organizations have responded to 
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this increased pressure from the government.  Locally, they were forced to 
modify their behavior and shift their activities to the smaller and more restricted 
secondary and tertiary rivers.  Regionally, the FARC, ELN, and AUC had to shift 
their operations away from the Caribbean coast and into the outer edges of the 
country.  Most importantly, economic activity that is crucial to both local and 













The United States naval force has experienced several changes since the 
end of the Cold War.  The unfortunate attacks perpetrated on September 11, 
2001 precipitated another shift within the U.S. naval forces as the nation entered 
into a self-defined global conflict.  The visionary determinations by both Admiral 
Clark and Admiral Mullen set a new course for the Navy to follow.  By late 2005 
the need for a “green water capability” was identified.  By early 2007 the 
response to the need took physical form as the new Riverine Group was 
established within the NECC.   
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a review of the Navy’s 
“past, current, and future” riverine capabilities.”  It found that by 2007, the 
projected date to establish the first riverine squadron, the U.S. Navy riverine 
would have to face a multitude of capability gaps across the range of military 
operations.  This thesis sought to examine the current capabilities of the 
Colombian riverine forces to address some of the capability gaps identified by the 
CNA report.  Specifically, this thesis relied on the methods used by the 
Colombian riverine forces in conducting counterinsurgency and line of 
communication operations in support of riverine security and control.  The intent 
was to provide a study of the varied Colombian experiences in order to present 
some beneficial guidelines for the U.S. naval riverine force.  
The third chapter of this thesis provided a historic timeline characterizing 
the Colombian riverine force development.  From this brief look at history it was 
obvious that the Colombia riverine force experienced some kind of transformation 
nearly every decade.  The events of La Violencia that triggered the mass unrest 
in the countryside were also the catalyst for the creation of the “Flotilla Avispa.”  
From that point on, the transcendence of the riverine force was closely tied with 
the political and social change of the nation.  As a result, Colombia has enjoyed 
over 50 years of uninterrupted service from their riverine force.  During their 
illustrious service to the nation, the Colombian riverine forces have confronted 
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peasant uprisings, armed bands, dissident groups, subversive guerrillas, drug 
cartels and the final evolution of the Narco-Terrorist Organization.  A lesson that 
can be learned from this Colombian riverine experience is that counterinsurgent 
operations cannot be confronted without a capable and well-manned riverine 
force.  To attain this, the riverine force must be continuously maintained and 
refined.  As the U.S. riverine force is once again called to assemble, we should 
be reminded that this capability has been required in various notable conflicts of 
the past.  As such, current naval procurement plans should look to keep this 
capability strong well past the current conflict in Iraq.  Only by making riverine 
operations a core Navy function will the future of this potentially effective 
resource be secured.   
The operational environment of Colombia provides a perspective in terms 
of the magnitude of problems that can affront a riverine force.  Colombia possess 
three distinct regions, each unique in its own right.  The arid regions and 
extensive beaches of the Caribbean are as different from the rocky cliffs and 
mangroves of the Pacific coast as they are from the floodplains and frontier rivers 
of the Eastern plains.  Each region has served as a functional tool for the ONT. 
As noted in chapter IV, when confronted by overwhelming power along the 
primary rivers, the ONTs will shift further upriver (similar to a phenomenon that 
occurred in Vietnam).  Likewise, regions of heavy rainfall, with their seasonal 
formation of secondary and tertiary waterways, provide the ONTs with greater 
mobility.  Therefore the requirement of a force that is capable of engaging the 
enemy along the secondary and tertiary riverways is essential.  To establish 
control or provide security in these areas, it is necessary to have vessels that can 
project firepower, but also have sufficient defensive capabilities to survive an 
attack.  The functionality of the Riverine Combat Group is effective in meeting 
this challenge.  Each Riverine Combat Group has a Light Riverine Support Patrol 
Boat (PAFL), two attached Light Riverine Combat Elements (ECFL) and can be 
embarked with a Riverine Assault force.  This structure is able to provide 
sufficient supporting or covering firepower via its PAFL, in addition to the potent 
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quick strike capability from its ECFL and the power projection from the river that 
comes from its embarked assault force.  
The Colombian riverine experience also demonstrates the need for a force 
capable of sustained forward operations to maintain control of the principal 
waterways.  A vessel like the Nodriza is indispensable in this endeavor. This 
Colombian innovation is replete with firepower that can overwhelm the enemy.  
Most importantly, it is protected by a two layered armored shell that has proven 
vital to its survivability.  This combination allows the ship to perform a vital 
function necessary to attain as well as maintain river control.  This unit can 
withstand direct enemy attacks and in exchange project overwhelming fire. This 
spiked blanket of security allows more vulnerable units like the ECF to regroup to 
later reengage the enemy under favorable terms.   
The ease of repairing the PAF, its survivability and capacity to perform 
multiple functions make it an essential platform in the joint riverine environment.  
The majority of its components are off-the-shelf technologies that make the ship’s 
systems easy to operate and reduce the overall price of manufacturing.  Finally, 
this unit is a fourth generation technology that at each step has adjusted and 
improved on the basic design.  A vessel like the PAF or Nodriza would be 
extremely useful to U.S. riverine operations.  This unit would provide forces with 
the ability to connect the upcoming Global Fleet Station with its subordinate 
tactical ships making it the next step in the evolution of riverine warfare.   
Riverine forces bridge the gap between land and sea forces.  They act 
and function in an environment that has been used in the past and will be 
exploited by our enemies in the future.  It is interesting that the events currently 
developing in Colombia can be seen as similar to the many historic battles and 
events in the interrupted history of U.S. riverine forces.  While looking back at the 
Seminole, Civil, and Vietnam Wars is important, Colombia represents a history 
book that is “alive.”  Many of the lessons one would read about are being played 
out in real life and under real circumstances.  The Colombian riverine experience 
is the epitome of an active learning classroom that must be studied and 
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understood.  The strong relationship between our two countries and the active 
engagement of the United States in Colombia since 1999 makes this information 
extremely accessible.  The hope of this thesis was not to provide a 
comprehensive and all inclusive look at Colombian riverine operations.  Rather, it 
was to show enough to spark an active curiosity on the part of U.S. riverine 
forces and shift their view southward.  Prudence would dictate that with modesty 
and an open mind, the United States can learn several lessons from its steadfast 
regional partner Colombia, which will prove crucial to the development of its own 
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